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INTRODUCTION
C URRENTLY, lawyers and courts are struggling with tort suits
brought by plaintiffs who seek compensation even though they
have not suffered any bodily harm or manifested symptoms signal-
ing the onset of a disease. These include, most prominently, claims
that a defendant's carelessness exposed the plaintiff to known car-
cinogens such as asbestos, or known pathogens such as HIV,
thereby putting the plaintiff at risk of developing a serious or fatal
illness in the future. As public awareness and concern over envi-
ronmental toxins and other hazardous substances continue to grow,
there is every reason to suppose that these claims will continue to
be pressed in courts around the country.' Yet judges and lawyers so
far have proceeded without a firm grasp of how this area of the law
is unfolding or ought to unfold.
By asking conferees to address this active and unsettled area of
tort law, the conference giving rise to this volume poses a basic
question to tort scholars: How can we best contribute to the analy-
sis of an emerging area of tort law? Perhaps the standard response
to this question invokes a sentiment sometimes attributed to Jus-
tice Holmes. The life of the law, he famously proclaimed, has not
'The prospect of a continuing flood of claims for fear of cancer by those exposed to
asbestos has moved the Supreme Court to review an unpublished state court decision
permitting such a claim. See Norfolk & W. Ry. Co. v. Ayers, 122 S.Ct. 1434 (2002)
(mem.) (granting petition for review). We discuss Ayers briefly below. See infra notes
128, 182.
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been "logic" but "experience., 2 It follows, according to his mod-
ern counterparts, that legal scholars "add value" by getting be-
yond the concepts of legal doctrine to the real or root policy
question of whether, or under what circumstances, recognition
of these claims will achieve desired social ends.' Thus, what is
called for on the Holmesian view is not the sort of formal or
conceptual analysis ("logic") that occupies lawyers and judges,
but pragmatic analysis (whether microeconomic or more broadly
welfarist) of what ends might be served by recognizing or not
recognizing these claims.
There is, however, a different approach to scholarly analysis in
unsettled areas of law, one traceable to another titan of American
law: Justice Cardozo' The Cardozoan approach rejects the Holme-
sian dichotomy between logic and experience. Indeed, it maintains
that scholars-at least scholars writing for lawyers and judges-do
more harm than good by attempting to answer questions of the sort
posed by "future injury" cases without attending to the conceptual
issues that they raise. Cardozoan "pragmatic conceptualism," as we
have previously called it, shares the Holmesian goal of promoting
ongoing revision of law and legal practices to meet new challenges,
like those posed by toxic exposure litigation! Yet it regards the
concepts of legal doctrine as an aid, rather than a hindrance, to that
progressive project.
In past works, we have made a case for pragmatic conceptualism
over pragmatic instrumentalism as a means of understanding tort
2 Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 1 (Boston, Little, Brown, & Co.
1948) (1881).
3 See John C.P. Goldberg, Twentieth Century Tort Theory, 90 Geo. L.J. (forthcom-
ing 2003) (manuscript on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (describing
Holmesian compensation-deterrence theory in these terms).
4 See, e.g., John C.P. Goldberg, The Life of the Law, 51 Stan. L. Rev. 1419, 1461-73
(1999) (arguing that Justice Cardozo employed a pragmatic form of conceptualism in
his decisionmaking); John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C. Zipursky, The Moral of
MacPherson, 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1733, 1812-24 (1998) (articulating Justice Cardozo's
belief that one could deploy the concept of duty in negligence law in a manner that
was progressive and pragmatic without being an instrumentalist); Benjamin C. Zipur-
sky, Pragmatic Conceptualism, 6 Legal Theory 457, 474-78 (2000) (outlining the
jurisprudential position of pragmatic conceptualism).
'See Zipursky, supra note 4; see also Goldberg, supra note 4, at 1462.
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law.6 This puts us distinctly in the minority: The Holmesian concep-
tion of legal scholarship has dominated among torts scholars in the
last century. Yet, one occasionally finds precedents that attest to
the efficacy of the minority approach. An unlikely example is pro-
vided by the famous article entitled "Privacy," published in 1960 by
Dean Prosser, a confirmed Holmesian.7 "Privacy" aimed to ration-
alize seemingly disparate judicial decisions permitting liability to
attach to invasions of the "right 'to be let alone"'-a right that
Warren and Brandeis had themselves earlier extracted from the
case law.8 Judicial issuance of these decisions, Prosser commented,
"has gone on without any plan... [and] without much realization
of what is happening or its significance."9 Still, he maintained, one
could discern order amidst the confusion: Privacy claims could be
reduced to one of four archetypal forms. 0 By prompting this reali-
zation, Prosser hoped to clarify lawyerly thinking about the nature
and proper scope of liability that attaches to claims for tortious in-
vasion of privacy. In fact, his re-conceptualization of the cases-
which he wrote into the Second Restatement-has set the terms of
legal analysis in this area ever since."
Our goal in this Article, although more ambitious than doctrinal
brush clearing, is not dissimilar to that of Prosser in "Privacy." We
aim to aid the courts in realizing what is happening in the emerging
6 In addition to the works cited in note 4, see John C.P. Goldberg & Benjamin C.
Zipursky, Concern for Cause: A Comment on the Twerski-Sebok Plan for Adminis-
tering Negligent Marketing Claims Against Gun Manufacturers, 32 Conn. L. Rev.
1411, 1418-23 (2000) [hereinafter Concern for Cause]; John C. P. Goldberg & Benja-
min C. Zipursky, The Restatement (Third) and the Place of Duty in Negligence Law,
54 Vand. L. Rev. 657, 723-36 (2001) [hereinafter The Place of Duty]; Arthur Ripstein
& Benjamin C. Zipursky, Corrective Justice in an Age of Mass Torts, in Philosophy
and the Law of Torts 214, 231-44 (Gerald J. Postema ed., 2001); Benjamin C. Zipur-
sky, Legal Malpractice and the Structure of Negligence Law, 67 Fordham L. Rev. 649,
675-76 (1998).
7 William L. Prosser, Privacy, 48 Cal. L. Rev. 383 (1960).
8 Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 Harv. L. Rev.
193, 195 (1890).
9 Prosser, supra note 7, at 422.
'0 Id. at 389 (describing four distinct privacy invasions as: intrusion upon plaintiff's
privacy, "public disclosure of embarrassing private facts," publicly placing plaintiff in
a false light, and the use of the plaintiff's "name or likeliness").
" See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 652A (1977); Sheldon W. Halpem, The Law
of Defamation, Privacy, Publicity and Moral Right: Cases and Materials on Protection
of Personality Interests 412 (4th ed. 2000) (noting that courts frequently employ
Prosser's categories).
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and important class of tort cases now gathered under the loose
banners of "future injury" or "inchoate torts." More specifically,
we aim to illuminate and help guide tort practice by attending to a
set of theoretical and conceptual questions raised by these cases.
The first and most theoretical question they pose concerns the
role of "injury" in tort law. To the extent that courts allow recovery
in suits based on not-yet-realized injuries, they might suggest the
demise of the traditional requirement that a tort plaintiff-or at
least a negligence or products liability plaintiff-prove that she suf-
fered an injury at the hands of a wrongdoer. On this conception, as
the title of this conference suggests, the imposition of liability in
heightened-risk cases is akin to the imposition of punishment for
inchoate crimes such as attempts and conspiracies. Thus, in terms
of theoretical significance, these cases might be taken to signal a
substantial break from traditional distinctions between crime and
tort as well as between public and private law.
Although theoretical, the issue of the injury requirement in tort
is quite important at a pragmatic level. Still, we concede that it is
likely not the most pressing issue in the minds of lawyers and
judges facing claims for heightened risk of physical injury. Rather,
they are more likely to be wrestling with the issue of whether or
when the imposition of such risk constitutes a compensable injury
to the person(s) exposed to the risk. On this view, the issue is not
whether there are any "inchoate" torts, but when a risk can be said
to have ripened into a cognizable harm.
This question, unfortunately, is hardly less daunting because it
leaves jurists with the difficult task of defining the injury suffered
by plaintiffs who have been exposed to toxic substances yet have
not manifested a physical injury or illness. Indeed, one tends to en-
counter two very different accounts on this score. The first main-
tains that a heightened risk of bodily harm or illness is a cognizable
injury in and of itself. That is, regardless of whether the risk has
matured into bodily, emotional, or economic harm, or ever will,
exposure to an increased risk of those harms is an injury in princi-
ple sufficient to support a claim for negligence or some other tort.
Therefore, a plaintiff who can establish that another actor negli-
gently exposed her to a known carcinogen or pathogen has made
out the elements of the prima facie case: duty, breach, cause, and
injury. Although, on this conception, heightened-risk claims are not
2002] 1629
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claims for inchoate torts, they may appear quite close to being such
claims by expanding the definition of injury to include heightened
risk.
The alternative account of heightened risk as injury maintains
that exposure to heightened risk of bodily harm or disease is a
genuine injury, but only when it is linked in the right way to some
other harm experienced by the plaintiff. The linked harms most
commonly identified by this sort of argument are emotional dis-
tress and economic loss. A heightened risk of future injury often is
tied to a present fear or apprehension in the plaintiff that arises out
of exposure to the risk. On this view, future injury cases in which
recovery is permitted are not claims for risk exposure, but instead
claims that fall within, or at least in the vicinity of, the category of
claims for negligent infliction of emotional distress. A heightened
risk of future injury also may be connected to present economic
loss: Those wrongfully exposed to toxic substances may reasonably
incur expenses associated with monitoring their physical condition
in light of their exposure. Thus, some plaintiffs treat heightened-
risk claims as if they were cousins of claims made against an ac-
counting firm by investors who have suffered economic loss be-
cause of the firm's negligently prepared audit report.
Analyses that attempt to hitch heightened-risk claims to the in-
juries of emotional distress and/or economic loss are more
grounded in familiar doctrine than those claiming that heightened-
risk claims are for inchoate wrongs, or that heightened risk is injury
by itself. They are hardly unproblematic, however, as can be illus-
trated by brief consideration of a leading case in this area, the
United States Supreme Court's decision in Metro-North Commuter
Railroad Co. v. Buckley.'2
Buckley was exposed to substantial amounts of asbestos dust in
his job as a pipefitter for Metro-North. 3 Although symptomless, he
sued the railroad on the ground that its negligence (for example, in
failing to provide safety equipment) had caused him to experience
a one to five percent increase in the likelihood of contracting can-
cer and/or asbestosis." The suit was brought under the Federal
12521 U.S. 424 (1997).
1Id. at 427.
14 Id.
1630 [Vol. 88:1625
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Employers' Liability Act ("FELA"), which permits a railroad
worker to recover for an injury resulting from the negligence of his
employer.15 Buckley's lawyers apparently did not argue that a
FELA plaintiff may recover without proof of injury. Nor did they
argue that exposure to heightened risk of disease is, in and of itself,
an injury. Rather, they framed Buckley's claims under FELA as,
respectively, sounding in negligent infliction of emotional distress
and negligence causing economic loss.
Buckley's lawyers had some grounds for optimism regarding the
emotional distress claim. The Supreme Court had held three years
earlier in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall that a railroad
worker could recover for emotional distress caused by her em-
ployer's carelessness if she "sustain[ed] a physical impact as a result
of a defendant's negligent conduct, or... [was] placed in immedi-
ate risk of physical harm by that conduct."16 Although Buckley had
not been placed in immediate risk of physical harm by Metro-
North's negligence, his lawyers argued that he was nonetheless en-
titled to recover under the first prong of Gottshall because his dis-
tress over his increased risk of disease was attendant on the "physi-
cal impact" of asbestos fibers lodging in his lungs.'
Writing for a majority of seven, Justice Breyer rejected this
claim. The "physical impact" language of Gottshall, he reasoned,
was not meant to establish a separate prong under which FELA
plaintiffs could establish a claim for negligent infliction of emo-
tional distress." Rather, it merely referred to the well-established-
if not obviously justified-doctrine holding that a plaintiff who suf-
fers a traumatic physical harm (for example, a broken limb, a lac-
eration, or an illness) may recover emotional distress damages as
parasitic on the predicate physical injury. 9 FELA plaintiffs bring-
ing pure emotional distress claims-distress not predicated on a
physical injury-must establish, as Buckley could not, that the de-
fendant's negligence had placed them in the "zone of danger," that
is, at imminent risk of physical harm. In offering this arguably nar-
145 U.S.C. § 51 (2000).
16512 U.S. 532,547-48 (1994) (emphasis added).
"Buckley, 521 U.S. at 427-28.
"Id. at 431-32.
,Id. at 429-30; see also Dan B. Dobbs, The Law of Torts § 302, at 822 (2000) (stat-
ing the traditional rule).
2002] 1631
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row construction of the statute, the Court relied heavily on "policy
reasons" immediately familiar to students of the common law of
torts.20 To permit claims such as Buckley's, the Court reasoned,
would be to expose FELA defendants to "unlimited and unpre-
dictable liability," to present the courts with hard-to-adjudicate
emotional distress claims, and to invite invalid or "trivial" claims.
21
Buckley's lawyers argued in the alternative that he would have
to undergo, as a matter of sound preventive medicine, regular
medical tests to monitor the development, if any, of the diseases at
which he was now at a higher risk of contracting." Because Buckley
would not have incurred these medical monitoring expenses but for
Metro-North's negligence, his attorneys argued that the company's
negligence had caused Buckley a form of economic loss.3 Accord-
ingly, Buckley's counsel sought damages equal to the expected fu-
ture cost of a reasonable program of medical monitoring. 4
In contrast to its emphatic rejection of Buckley's emotional dis-
tress claim, the Supreme Court displayed ambivalence in address-
ing his medical monitoring-economic loss claim. The Court con-
ceded, as it had not earlier in the opinion, that Buckley "has
suffered wrong at the hands of a negligent employer."' Still, the
Court was troubled by the "potential systemic effects" of recogniz-
ing a claim such as Buckley's. 6 Such recognition, the majority
speculated, might invite "tens of millions" of claims, many of which
might be fraudulent, for relatively minor injuries. Especially in the
context of asbestos litigation, where the assets available to com-
pensate tort victims are not sufficient to permit the recovery of full
compensation by all those injured, the Court worried that permit-
ting Buckley's claim would set inequitable priorities among claim-
ants, permitting the exposed-but-uninjured to recover before (and
possibly more than) those who have manifested diseases.'
20 Buckley, 521 U.S. at 433.
21 Id. (quoting Gottshall, 512 U.S. at 557).
22 Id. at 438.
2 Id.24 Buckley v. Metro-North Commuter R.R., 79 F.3d 1337, 1346-47 (2d Cir. 1996),
rev'd, 521 U.S. 424 (1997).
" Buckley, 521 U.S. at 443.26 Id.
27 Id. at 442-44.
28 Id. at 435-36.
1632 [Vol. 88:1625
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In light of these concerns and its prior holding on emotional dis-
tress, one might have expected the majority to hold that claims for
medical monitoring expenses are simply not cognizable under
FELA. Yet, Justice Breyer's opinion stopped short of that blanket
rule. Courts, he concluded, cannot recognize suits seeking lump-
sum payments for future medical monitoring costs. Nonetheless,
judges may be able to order the creation of funds that reimburse
plaintiffs' reasonable monitoring expenses on an ongoing basis.
Thus, the majority remanded the case for the Second Circuit Court
of Appeals to consider whether FELA "might, or might not, ac-
commodate medical cost recovery rules more finely tailored than
the rule we have considered."29
Justice Ginsburg, in dissent, described this final twist in the ma-
jority's analysis as "enigmatic."' The policy concerns identified by
the majority, she reasoned, either do or do not counsel against rec-
ognizing Buckley's cause of action for pure economic loss. 31 If they
do, then he has no right to any recovery. If they do not, then he has
such a right, and the form of the remedy appropriate to vindicate
that right is of no particular legal significance.
Buckley indicates that heightened-risk litigants (and courts adju-
dicating their claims) do not face a smooth road simply by steering
clear of the doctrinal and theoretical potholes attending efforts to
argue that exposure to risk is an injury in and of itself. This should
not be a surprise. Even outside the context of heightened-risk claims,
the law concerning negligent infliction of emotional distress and
pure economic loss is confused. In the former category, for exam-
ple, courts employ, or have employed, a tangled array of concepts
such as "predicate injury," "parasitic damage," "impact," "zone of
danger," "foreseeability," "direct/indirect," and "bystander."
In short, we see in modern tort litigation over conduct causing
heightened risk of future injury what Dean Prosser saw in the early
privacy cases: lawyers and judges muddling through, without a full
realization of what is happening or its significance. The goal of this
Article, like Prosser's goal in "Privacy," is to help them move to-
ward a clearer realization of what is happening in this important,
"Id. at 444.
3Id. at 445, 455 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
31 See id. at 448.
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emerging area of tort law. We will proceed in that project by ana-
lyzing the issues posed by future injury cases in the order just dis-
cussed.
Parts I and II will address the theoretical question of the signifi-
cance of future injury claims for tort law as a whole." Part I will
maintain that future injury claims should not be regarded as point-
ing toward the recognition of tort liability for inchoate wrongs. To
the contrary, a tort plaintiff must establish the occurrence of a real-
ized wrong before liability may attach. This realization require-
ment is central to tort law and distinguishes it as a species of pri-
vate law from the public law departments of criminal and regulatory
law.
Part II will entertain the argument that heightened risk of physi-
cal injury, in and of itself, is a cognizable harm. Here, we will as-
sume that exposure to heightened risk of physical injury can consti-
tute a loss of welfare. That is, we will take seriously the idea that
claims for heightened risk are claims for "choate" rather than "in-
choate" torts, with the harm being the heightened risk of injury it-
self. Nonetheless, we will argue that this sort of harm usually does
not, as a matter of existing negligence law, suffice to generate a tort
cause of action in the plaintiff. In this sense, it is, at most, a non-
cognizable harm-a harm but not an injury. This aspect of the law
is grounded in the particular conception of duty that undergirds
negligence. The duties typically recognized within the law of negli-
gence are duties to take care not to cause "ultimate" or "target"
harms, such as bodily harm or illness. By contrast, negligence law
does not treat the "intermediate" or "unripened" harm of height-
ened risk as actionable injury. We will further suggest that tort law
has sound reasons for generally recognizing duties to avoid causing
ultimate harms, as opposed to duties to avoid causing the interme-
diate harm of enhanced risk of physical harm.
Part III will turn from tort theory writ large to the more immedi-
ate doctrinal issue of whether future injury suits can sometimes
properly be cast as claims for negligent infliction of emotional dis-
tress. Here, we will argue that conceptualizing heightened-risk
Although this analysis is integral to the analysis that follows in subsequent Parts,
those readers most interested in the practical-doctrinal issues raised when future in-
jury cases are framed as claims for emotional distress or economic loss may wish to
proceed to Parts III and IV.
1634 [Vol. 88:1625
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claims in terms of emotional distress, although understandable, is a
mistake, in part because the whole category of negligent infliction
of emotional distress is infested with confusions. After offering a
fresh interpretation of this much-analyzed-yet-misunderstood area
of negligence law, we will argue that insofar as they are actionable
because they are attended by an injury having to do with the vic-
tim's apprehension of the risk, heightened-risk claims are better
conceived of as close cousins of torts such as assault, nuisance, and
false imprisonment. That is, the ultimate injury attending these
heightened-risk claims-and indeed most claims falling under the
ill-conceived rubric of negligent infliction of emotional distress-is
a harm to the plaintiff's interest in being able to function in society
free of the pall of a significant threat to his well-being created by
the wrongful acts of others. Conceiving of the injury in these cases
as being placed under threat, we will argue, accomplishes what
Prosser accomplished when he parsed privacy claims into four dis-
tinct privacy torts: it better captures the interests at stake, thereby
permitting courts to draw more intelligent lines in determining
when liability should attach in negligence for such injuries.
Part IV will argue that the "enigmatic" last step in Buckley's
analysis of claims for heightened risk-as claims for the expenses
associated with medical monitoring-correctly linked the issues of
right and remedy, although for reasons the Court itself seems only
dimly to have perceived. The majority was right to conclude that
the form of remedy-lump-sum versus scheduled payments-is
critical to the viability of claims like Buckley's, although not for the
reasons it offered. Rather, the form of payment is important be-
cause these claims are not rightly conceptualized as seeking com-
pensation for a completed tort. Instead, they are requests for
courts to exercise their equitable powers to enjoin parties like
Metro-North to undertake affirmative efforts to protect plaintiffs
whom have been exposed to heightened risk of disease by their
negligence. In other words, in our view, Buckley's second claim did
not seek a compensatory remedy for a realized wrong; rather, it
sought a proactive court order requiring Metro-North, whose neg-
ligent conduct imperiled Buckley, to take affirmative steps to "res-
cue" Buckley (minimize his peril) by paying for his medical moni-
toring.
2002] 1635
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We will conclude by returning to the methodological and juris-
prudential issues with which we commenced this introductory dis-
cussion. As the foregoing roadmap indicates, our approach to the
problem of liability for future injuries stands in contrast to the
Holmesian-instrumentalist approach employed by the majority of
leading torts scholars, including many of the distinguished panelists
at this conference. By applying pragmatic conceptualism to a con-
temporary problem in torts, we hope to supplement previously
presented philosophical, historical, and doctrinal arguments for this
approach with a tangible demonstration of its worth.
I. REALIZED WRONGS
A. Crime versus Tort
There is a fundamental distinction between criminal law, on the
one hand, and tort law, on the other.33 Criminal law sometimes
prohibits and punishes genuinely inchoate wrongs-uncompleted
wrongful acts. Tort law does not.
Suppose X undertakes a plot to avenge a perceived slight by Y
by blowing up Y's car in the middle of the night when no one is in
it. X carefully records his plan in his diary, constructs the explosive
device, then drives his car (with diary, device, and a map marking
the route on the front seat) toward Y's house. However, X's plot is
foiled when he is pulled over by the police one block from Y's
house for a traffic violation, at which point his plot is discovered.
In the majority of jurisdictions, the fact that X has failed in his
effort does not defeat criminal liability,' nor does the fact that the
once-significant threat to Y's property has now passed. So long as
X can be found to have acted with the requisite intent, and to have
made a "substantial step" toward completion of the intended
crime, failure to complete the plan does not decriminalize the con-
duct; it instead alters the charges that the prosecution may bring
from, say, arson or criminal destruction of property to attempted
3' Cf. Palsgraf v. Long Island R. Co., 162 N.E. 99, 101 (N.Y. 1928) (explaining that to
permit a tort plaintiff to sue for acts that are wrongful only to others is to "ignore the
fundamental difference between tort and crime").
Wayne R. LaFave, Criminal Law § 6.2, at 550 (3d ed. 2000).
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arson and attempted destruction of property.5 Likewise, if in the
foregoing hypothetical Z helped plot the bombing, X and Z may,
under the right circumstances, be prosecuted for conspiracy to
commit arson, and so on. 6
Despite the fact that X and Z have committed crimes, Y cannot,
on these facts, sue either of them in tort. Claims for battery, as-
sault, and conversion will fail because they require Y to have suf-
fered, respectively, harmful or offensive physical contact, the ap-
prehension that such contact was imminent, or actual damage to
property. There are no torts of attempted battery, attempted as-
sault, or attempted conversion. Similarly, after X's and Z's plot has
been foiled, Y has no cause of action against either for conspiracy
because, strictly speaking, there is no tort of civil conspiracy;
rather, that phrase refers to a rule of joint liability for co-
tortfeasors.37
The same holds true for garden-variety claims sounding in negli-
gence and products liability. Take a classic negligence case such as
Vaughn v. Menlove.' Menlove built his haystack in a manner that
increased the risk that it would catch fire, and hence increased the
risk that Vaughn's neighboring property and dwellings would be
damaged by fire.39 Suppose, however, the hay had never caught fire
and was later dismantled. At that point, Vaughn would not have
been able to sue Menlove in negligence for building a haystack that
at one time increased Menlove's risk of suffering property dam-
age.'
' Model Penal Code § 5.01(1), at 295-96 (1985) (defining attempt). Alternatively, X
miht be charged with a possession crime. LaFave, supra note 34, § 6.2, at 537-38.
Model Penal Code § 5.03(1), at 382-83 (defining conspiracy).
'7 Dobbs, supra note 19, § 340, at 936 ("Conspiracy is not a tort in itself; it reflects
the conclusion that each participant should be liable for the tortious course of con-
duct.").
132 Eng. Rep. 490 (C.P. 1837).
39Id. at 491.
, To constitute a nuisance, an activity ordinarily must "interfere with" another's use
of her property by, for example, generating noxious odors or noise. However, some
courts have held that a noninvasive hazard on a property can constitute a nuisance to
neighboring property owners, albeit only if it poses such significant dangers as to ren-
der the neighbors' property essentially useless and valueless, as might the construc-
tion and operation of a fireworks or explosive factory next to a residence. See 1 Dan
B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages-Equity-Restitution § 5.6(1), at 754 (2d ed.
1993); Dobbs, supra note 19, § 466, at 1332. Menlove would have had no such claim
against Vaughn.
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Likewise, suppose car driver D speeds down a residential street
for amusement, indifferent to the well-being of others, passing P's
yard in the process. P has her back turned to the street and is lis-
tening to a portable CD player and thus does not notice D driving
by. Later, however, she sees police cars driving by her yard. Upon
investigation, P surmises that D in fact drove his car at a very high
rate of speed in close proximity to her while she was working in the
yard. P has no cause of action in negligence simply because D's
negligent driving at one time increased her risk of injury, even
though the act may perhaps have constituted the crime of reckless
endangerment.4 Or suppose that mall owner M fails for a period of
six months to take reasonable precautions to secure the mall's
parking lot from criminal activity. After that time, the mall closes.
Even in a jurisdiction recognizing an obligation owed by M to pro-
vide reasonable security for the benefit of mall patrons, those pa-
trons cannot prevail in a negligence suit by establishing by convinc-
ing evidence that M's carelessness increased the risk to each of
them of being attacked.
Each of the foregoing examples involves conduct that constitutes
a departure from legal standards of required conduct. Moreover, in
each example, a risk of injury was posed to another person. Yet in
each situation the risk was not realized with respect to that person.
These examples indicate that, although tort law concerns itself with
wrongs, not every wrong or even every legal wrong is a tort. Tort
utilizes a conception of wrongs that involves "realized" wrongs. If a
physician negligently fails to ascertain whether her patient is Rh-
before delivering her baby, and the patient is in fact Rh+, yet that
mistake has no significance for the care accorded to mother and
child, no tort has occurred. The physician's conduct fell below the
standard of care, and is in that sense wrongful, but it is not a tor-
tious wrong. Rather, the wrong committed by the physician is an
example of an unrealized wrong, and malpractice law, as a branch
of tort, requires realized wrongs. Similarly, one who drives care-
lessly, taking his eyes off the road, may have acted carelessly, but
not tortiously, if no person or property is harmed. It is an unreal-
" See Model Penal Code § 211.2, at 194 (1980) (defining the crime of recklessly en-
dangering another); see also id. § 211.2 cmt. 3, at 203 (noting that conduct need not
actually endanger anyone to constitute the crime of reckless endangerment, so long as
the actor does not actually know that no one is endangered).
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ized wrong. Tort law does not impose any sanction on defendants
under such circumstances, nor does it reward plaintiffs for pointing
out or proving the occurrence of these wrongdoings. '
The idea of realized wrongs can perhaps be better understood if
we first distinguish between two ways of identifying actions for the
purposes of classifying them as wrongs or not wrongs. Sometimes
one can speak of actions in a manner that makes little or no refer-
ence to features outside of the actor's control. Suppose, for exam-
ple, that speaker S, looking at a piece of jewelry, makes the follow-
ing assertion: "That piece of jewelry contains a genuine emerald."
We can answer the question of whether this speech act was a sin-
cere assertion or an insincere assertion without answering the ques-
tion of whether the jewelry does in fact contain a genuine emerald.
Conversely, we cannot answer the question of whether S's state-
ment was a true assertion or a false assertion without knowing
whether the jewelry contains a genuine emerald. We might, then,
call the classifications of "sincere"/"insincere" as externally inde-
pendent action classifications. For purposes of evaluating speech
acts falling within these classifications, we need not know about
facts external to S, such as the materials that make up the jewelry.
All we need to do is gauge the sincerity of S's beliefs. By contrast,
the classifications of "true" assertion and "false" assertion consti-
tute externally dependent action classifications: whether they are
applicable depends on facts external to and independent of the
agent's beliefs and conduct.
The question of whether a wrong has been realized is more akin
to the question about the truth or falsity of S's assertion than its
sincerity or insincerity: It requires that we classify conduct in terms
of externally dependent action classifications. Indeed, the very dis-
tinction between realized and unrealized wrongs is whether the de-
fendant's potentially injurious conduct has in fact ripened into an
injury. A defendant may act in a manner that risks an injury, or
even in a manner that almost surely will bring about an injury, but
that does not mean that the injury will actually occur. Note also
that the classification of unrealized wrong is every bit as dependent
42 Dean Hurd has argued, along similar lines, that tort law embodies a conception of
wrongdoing that requires risks to "materialize" before they can count as tortious
wrongs. Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. Rev. 249, 262
(1996).
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upon external facts as that of realized wrong, just as false assertion
is no less dependent than true assertion upon external facts. If we
do not know whether the jewel is an emerald, we do not know
whether the utterance was true. If we do not know whether the in-
jurious conduct actually ripened into injury, we do not know
whether the conduct was realized.
This last point is potentially confusing, because there is a third
category-the realizable wrong-that closely resembles a realized
wrong, but that can be an externally independent action classifica-
tion, just as sincere assertion can be. Driving in an unduly risky
manner is, for example, a realizable wrong until such time as the
wrongdoing ceases to have causal efficacy:43 We can know whether
someone has driven in a risky manner without knowing whether
the risk has been realized. Whether some acts that threaten an as-
yet unrealized physical harm may constitute a realized wrong (of a
different type) will be discussed in Parts II-IV.
The category of inchoate crimes includes the class of unrealized
and (at the time of prosecution) unrealizable wrongs. Attempt
crimes, such as the failed effort described above in the bombing
example, provide the most notable instances of this sort of wrong.
Proof of the attempt crime may require proof that the wrong was
at one time realizable; that there was an effort to murder, for ex-
ample.' But it does not require that the wrong be realized and it
does not matter that the wrong is no longer realizable.
The same is not true in torts. As noted earlier, a failed attempt
to destroy someone's property, unattended by any other conse-
quence for the victim, is not actionable in tort. And the same is ob-
viously true for the other previously discussed examples. Many of
" Causal efficacy here invokes cause in both its factual and normative senses. The
idea, in the famous language of Chief Judge Magruder, is that at a certain point the
risks lurking within a wrongful act dissipate even though, as a matter of fact, the
wrongful act ends up being a necessary step in a causal sequence leading to an injury
unrelated to the risk. Marshall v. Nugent, 222 F.2d 604, 612 (1st Cir. 1955). Consider,
for example, a speeding automobile driver who safely comes to a stop, then carefully
opens his car door, in the process striking and injuring a passing cyclist. The wrong of
speeding is not a proximate cause of the cyclist's injury precisely because the risks at-
tending the misconduct (losing control, not having enough time to avoid a collision,
etc.) had dissipated.
4 We leave aside here issues of mistake and impossibility.
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these actions can be sanctioned under the criminal law, but are not
actionable in tort. The plaintiff must prove realization.'u
B. Tort as Civil Recourse
The non-actionability in tort of unrealized wrongs poses a signifi-
cant problem for perhaps the dominant modem academic concep-
tion of tort law, which treats it as a system for deterring antisocial
conduct. Whether they work within a loose utilitarian framework,46
or a somewhat more technical economic theory,47 most tort scholars
have adopted the view that the main point of tort law is to provide
legal incentives that will steer actors away from unjustifiably risky
or socially harmful conduct by penalizing them if they engage in
such conduct. If, however, tort law resembles criminal law in aim-
ing to sanction socially harmful types of conduct, then we are left
to ponder why tort law does not recognize inchoate wrongs. What,
on the deterrence model, can explain this fundamental difference
between tort and crime? The question becomes more acute when
we move from criminal law to the regulatory law of the modern
administrative state. On the deterrence view, safety regulations is-
sued by agencies such as OSHA or EPA are even closer relatives
to tort than criminal laws: They set standards, backed by fines or
other sanctions that, in theory, will deter socially undesirable con-
duct. To the extent that regulations are enforced by public officials
(as opposed to private citizens granted private rights of action), re-
sultant harm is not always, perhaps not even typically, a threshold
45 This is not to deny, of course, that many tort plaintiffs obtain settlements without
proving the realization of a harm to them. See Goldberg & Zipursky, Concern for
Cause, supra note 6, at 1415 n.13 (arguing that although the Agent Orange settlement
allocated funds on a risk-of-harm basis, it did not announce or portend a new, risk-
based approach to tort liability). Nor is it to deny that courts sometimes adjust bur-
dens of proof for equitable reasons in a manner that permits plaintiffs to recover
without having to prove that a particular defendant's tortious conduct caused injury
to them. See Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 231-44 (discussing burden-shifting
in market share and alternative liability cases).
" See, e.g., Gary T. Schwartz, Mixed Theories of Tort Law: Affirming Both Deter-
rence and Corrective Justice, 75 Tex. L. Rev. 1801, 1816 (1997) (arguing that tort law
is fundamentally concerned with deterring disutilitarian conduct, but that it pursues
that goal within justice-based side constraints).
41 See William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort
Law 4-5 (1987) (describing the deterrence focus of utilitarian and economic theories
of tort).
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requirement for the issuance by an agency of regulatory sanctions
against a wrongdoer. Why should it be a threshold requirement in
tort law?
The absence of inchoate torts is not an anomaly, but points to a
fundamental feature of tort law not fully captured by deterrence
models. The differential treatment of inchoate wrongs in criminal
law and tort law is explained by the different identity of the party
bringing the action in each case. The state, representing the people,
sometimes enjoys the power to punish for realizable wrongs and
regulate for pure risk. Individuals (and the state when it acts in the
capacity of an individual, for example, as a property owner suing
for trespass) do not enjoy the power to demand the imposition of
liability for any wrongs except realized wrongs. Of course, this just
pushes the issue back a step. Now the question arises of how to ex-
plain the difference in treatment of suits prosecuted by the state
versus those pursued by individuals.
Before sketching the answer to this question, a few preliminaries
are in order. First, observe that our analysis provides a different fo-
cus than the standard deterrence-based account. The focus is no
longer on the defendant, on how deserving of punishment the de-
fendant is, or on the efficacy of sanctioning possible defendants.
We are looking at the issue in terms of the identity of the party
bringing the action. The question is why a tort plaintiff has rights
that hinge on whether there is a realized wrong, but the state's
powers to enact and enforce criminal and administrative law do
not.
The second caveat is that the discussion thus far has contained
generalizations that may suggest a certain naivet6 on our part both
about the distant history of tort and criminal law and about their
current complexity. We are aware, however, of both historical and
contemporary variations in criminal and tort law that permit, re-
spectively, private actions for quasi-criminal punishment and pub-
lic actions for private damages.' These do indeed complicate the
'See David Lieberman, Mapping Criminal Law: Blackstone and the Categories of
English Jurisprudence, in Law, Crime and English Society 1660-1840 (N. Landau ed.,
forthcoming 2002) (on file with the Virginia Law Review Association) (describing
Blackstone's distinction between tort and crime in terms similar to the ones we draw,
and noting that hybrid actions existed in his time); J. Randy Beck, The False Claims
Act and The English Eradication of Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. Rev. 539 (2000)
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story, but their acknowledged existence as hybrids supports the ba-
sic themes of the account we are about to offer. Similarly, in insist-
ing on the distinction between areas of law where injury is a re-
quirement and those where it is not, we do not thereby mean to
ignore that questions about what can count as a wrong or injury are
often nuanced and often influenced by pragmatic considerations.
Indeed, a central aim of Parts III and IV is to explore why the defi-
nition of actionable injury takes on the complex role that it does,
and how the tort law goes about elaborating and revising its con-
ception of injuries and wrongs.
So much for preliminaries. On our view, a plaintiff in a tort case
has a right of action only because the defendant has committed a
legal wrong against the plaintiff, that is, only if the plaintiff has suf-
fered a wrong at the hands of the defendant. A right of action liter-
ally is a right, provided and mediated by our civil legal system, to
act against the defendant in a particular way." The reason the court
system makes available rights of action in tort cases is that the sys-
tem is built on the idea that those who have been wronged are enti-
tled to some avenue of recourse against the wrongdoer. But, in a
civil society, private violence is not permitted, even where there
has been a legal wrong. The state therefore ordinarily must make
some avenue of recourse available to the victim. It does this
through the courts, via the tort system.
On our civil recourse conception, the black-letter rule that tort
actions require an injury, and the precept injuria absque damno
(wrong without harm), flow from this aspect of the normative
structure of tort law. The point is not that defendants do not de-
serve liability unless their conduct amounts to a realized wrong.
Nor is it that society would fail to benefit from their being sanc-
tioned. The injury requirement, in other words, is not immediately
concerned with whether a defendant ought to pay for her wrongs,
either as a matter of punishment or deterrence. Rather, it is a re-
quirement of standing set by tort law. When defendant D argues
that plaintiff P has suffered no injury (and, hence, implicitly, that
injury is necessary to P's claim), D is arguing that this plaintiff
(discussing actions under the Federal False Claims Act in light of the history of qui
tam actions).
49Benjamin C. Zipursky, Civil Recourse, Not Corrective Justice, 90 Geo. L.J.
(forthcoming 2003).
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ought not be permitted a right of action because, even granted that
D acted wrongfully, P has not actually been wronged by her, and
that P having been wronged by D is a prerequisite to being entitled
to legal recourse against her.
This conception of recourse may strike some readers as archaic
or barbaric because it links torts to vengeance or retaliation, a con-
ception of tort that Holmes prominently and influentially rejected
in The Common Law as inappropriate to modem society." Per-
haps, the objection might continue, it makes a certain amount of
sense to say that only one who has been wronged by another can
claim a right to retaliation, but that carries weight only if tort law is
conceived as being about retaliation. Haven't we advanced beyond
this barbaric conception of tort?
Clearly, society has advanced beyond clan feuds, duels, and
other forms of officially sanctioned, private retaliatory violence.
The idea of civil recourse is not an idea of private retaliation, how-
ever. On the contrary, some avenue of redress is required precisely
because retaliation is no longer permitted. The courts settle dis-
putes within a framework of civil law. But this is simply to say that
our system of legal rights of action by putative victims against puta-
tive wrongdoers replaces a system of retaliation, not that it is one.
The false equation of recourse and retaliation ultimately rests on
a confusion. It is one thing to say that, in a modern and civilized
form of government, the right to private vengeance is eliminated
and replaced by the operation of the state and its legal system. It
hardly follows, however, that a modern and civilized form of gov-
ernment centralizes, or ought to centralize, all power to seek re-
dress of wrongs through the state. The modern state arguably does
maintain a monopoly on the business of imposing formal sanctions
for legal wrongdoing, but that monopoly does not extend to prose-
cution-the power to trigger the apparatus of the legal system. The
state, at least at a general level, retains the power to decide
whether to enforce a demand for redress by the individual against
another individual. And, more generally, the courts have created
the rules that determine when such demands are to be enforced.
But the power to make the demand, in private law, resides in the
"Holmes, supra note 2, at 2-5 (discussing the transition from ancient-barbaric to
modern-civilized notions of justice).
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individual. The principle found throughout the law of torts, that
only a plaintiff who was injured by the defendant has a tort action
against the defendant, derives from the basic normative structure
of the private law. The power to sue rests on an entitlement to
have some avenue of recourse against the defendant. In torts, this
entitlement derives from the fact that the plaintiff has been
wronged by the defendant, and yet is (almost always) barred by
law (including criminal and tort law itself) from retaliation in the
form of self-help. 1
Criminal prosecutions operate in a different manner. The state
(as prosecutor) has the power to demand that a defendant be pun-
ished. Again, the courts decide whether such a demand should be
enforceable, here based on rules created by legislation. The crimi-
nal law, in contrast to tort law, does not contain a principle that
prosecutions are only possible where a wrong has been perpetrated
against a particular individual. That is because the state's power to
punish does not entirely derive from an entitlement to redress a
wrong to itself. The state's power to punish instead derives from its
power to enforce publicly justifiable rules of conduct of a certain
kind.2 A publicly justifiable rule of conduct may prohibit not only
the doing of realized wrongs, but also the doing of even unrealized
and unrealizable wrongs. It follows that a punishable violation of
such a rule may exist even where a once-realizable wrong turned
out to be unrealized.
The same may be said of the state's power to sanction the viola-
tion of legislative or regulatory safety standards. That power comes
from the state's entitlement to lay down regulations for the public
good and to enforce the regulations that it lays down. 3 Within the
domain of legitimate regulations of conduct are ones that prohibit
certain kinds of action, even where those actions are within the
domain of externally independent action classifications. Hence, the
state can require that one not drive above a certain speed, and it
'
1Zipursky, supra note 49.
Here we refer to the "state" generically, not meaning to address issues of federal-
ism. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 618 (2000) (noting that the American
states' power to define and punish criminal conduct resides in their general "police
power"); 4 William Blackstone, Commentaries *7 (noting the state's authority to en-
act criminal law "for the government and tranquility of the whole").
5 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 8 cls. 1, 3 & 18.
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can enforce these regulations. Indeed, inchoate crimes and regula-
tions of risk-generating conduct-types are simply two different sub-
categories of action classifications that are not dependent upon the
occurrence of an injury.
On our account, then, there is a fundamental difference between
tort law, on the one hand, and criminal and regulatory law en-
forcement, on the other. This difference goes to the question of
where the power to enforce derives from. With respect to criminal
and regulatory law, the power to enforce derives from the power to
be the enforcer of legitimate rules in the public arena, which has
been delegated to the state. The power to enforce in torts derives
from having been the victim of a wrong. That is why a wrong must
have been realized in the plaintiff, in tort, but no wrong needs to
have been realized in criminal or regulatory law.
Today's most highly touted theories of tort law are, like Judge
Posner's, regulatory models which treat the tort system as a pri-
vately enforced version of risk regulation. ' It is merely useful, not
fundamental, that tort actions are brought by parties who were
wronged. It is useful both because the personal experience of hav-
ing been injured lowers information costs and because the prospect
of compensation for those injuries provides private parties with an
incentive to enforce. Hence, tort law is an ancient (if misunder-
stood) version of what Congress has deliberately created in, for ex-
ample, qui tam actions. As a bonus, according to the Posnerian ac-
count, tort law neutralizes what would otherwise be a socially
counterproductive tendency of potentially injured parties to take
too much caution in undertaking activities in which they might be
injured if another party were to act negligently; the prospect of
compensation through tort alleviates the need for inefficient levels
of caution by potential plaintiffs."
Another commonly offered deterrence-based answer to this
question of why tort requires realization appears equally unsatis-
factory. The claim is that limiting tort to choate wrongs serves a
second policy objective by allowing tort to compensate as it deters.
This explanation is unsatisfactory for several reasons. Many tort
'* See Goldberg, supra note 3 (manuscript at 36-38) (describing economic deter-
rence theory).
55 Landes & Posner, supra note 47, at 62 (noting that the absence of driver liability
in negligence to pedestrians may cause pedestrians to take excessive precautions).
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claims are almost entirely non-compensatory, as for example are
claims for punitive damages grounded in compensatory claims
seeking only nominal or minimal damages. More fundamentally,
ascribing a compensatory function to tort law does not by itself rule
out a legal system that requires actors who commit unrealized
wrongs to compensate for the real costs of injuries suffered by
other actors engaging in similar but realized wrongs. The compen-
satory function of tort, in other words, could be met by any pay-
ment flowing from a wrongdoer to an innocent sufferer of injury: it
does not by itself require payment to the victim by the person
whose wrong injured the victim. Yet, tort law insists not only on
the existence of wrongdoing and injury, but on the defendant's
wrong having been realized in the form of an injury to the plain-
tiff.-6
The prevailing regulatory models are unsatisfactory because
they fail to explain why a defendant's risky conduct should escape
sanction in the absence of a loss, and why an uninjured plaintiff
would not sometimes be an appropriate commencer of an action
that aims to sanction risk-causing (or loss-causing) actors. The
question becomes even more pressing when we realize that large
areas of conduct generating peril to individual health and safety
are not the subject of criminal law or more traditional regulation.
Given that a good deal of risky conduct-driving carelessly, com-
mitting malpractice, failing to maintain one's premises safely-falls
below the criminal and regulatory radar either formally or in prac-
tice, it might be socially desirable to have routine regulation of this
conduct through civil causes of action that are not limited to suits
brought by persons complaining of realized wrongs.
The standard Posnerian response to this objection is to argue
that a system that permits actions for unrealized torts, while ac-
ceptable in principle, would overdeter in practice. As Part II will
discuss, there are undoubtedly concerns, both pragmatic and prin-
cipled, that counsel against the recognition of inchoate torts. But
the threat-of-overdeterrence rationale hardly seems the most im-
portant. Courts already have means at their disposal to control for
' The importance of this sort of "bipolarity" to tort has been most forcefully em-
phasized by Professor Weinrib. See Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private Law 134-
36 (1995).
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overdeterrence. Indeed, as Buckley indicates, modern courts are
not at all shy about invoking concerns over excessive liability as a
ground for cutting off or capping liability. Why then draw the line
at injury? Moreover, at least in some areas, the problem that we
face today is more likely to be underdeterrence, considering diffi-
culties in detecting certain forms of wrongful conduct, the inade-
quacy of damages to compensate injured plaintiffs fully, the exis-
tence of "cheap" settlements, the undercapitalization of corporate
defendants, etc.57 From a prescriptive point of view, these reasons
suggest that a rationally designed deterrence-based conception of
tort, particularly in an environment where a variety of risks are in-
adequately covered by direct regulation, would include liability for
at least some classes of unrealized wrongs. From an interpretive
point of view, they cast doubt on the plausibility of the concern for
overdeterrence as an explanation of the injury requirement, which
in turn casts doubt on the explanatory power of the deterrence
model.
We also cast a skeptical eye on claims seeking recovery for mere
risk exposure. But it is essential that the starting point be an under-
standing of the cases and an understanding of the reasons tort law
is structured as it is. We therefore favor an interpretive framework
that more plausibly explains what tort law actually is and does. The
framework offered here better explains why it is that, in torts, a de-
fendant will not be held liable for unrealized wrongs, but will be
held liable for wrongs that are realized in an injury. Torts is not
primarily a regulatory system, but a system in which private parties
are afforded an avenue of redress against those who have wronged
them.
To grasp the idea that civil recourse animates tort is not to un-
cover instructions for resolving a particular dispute. However, as
we have argued elsewhere, the principles that undergird tort law at
least provide a sort of default with respect to the practical question
of adjudication. 8 In other words, it ought to take a significant com-
bination of substantive moral, political, and economic arguments
about the desirability of recognizing departures from the ideal of
'7 See, e.g., Richard L. Abel, The Real Tort Crisis-Too Few Claims, 48 Ohio St.
L.J. 443 (1987) (arguing that tort claims are underlitigated by tort victims).
See Goldberg & Zipursky, The Place of Duty, supra note 6, at 724-32.
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civil recourse, as well as an institutional argument about the ap-
propriateness of judges being the ones to undertake those depar-
tures, in order to justify substantial deviations from this frame-
work.
Of course, if we shift perspectives, from adjudication to legisla-
tion, the interrelation of the normative and the practical should be
characterized somewhat differently because legislatures, in our sys-
tem, have greater discretion than judges to revise the law to serve
desired goals. In the present context, the question becomes
whether a legislator anxious to regulate certain forms of undesir-
able conduct should put her efforts into the particular project of
legislatively modifying tort doctrine so that inchoate wrongs be-
come actionable. It is far from obvious why this would be desirable.
Such legislation typically would not be justified on the basis of the
need of the victims-victims of realized wrongs are already em-
powered to sue, so the imagined legislation would only serve to
empower those without injuries. Such beneficence, as Justice
Breyer pointed out in Buckley, is not only unmotivated, it may ac-
tually cut against the recognition of liability for unrealized torts,
since this will often supplant liability to those with ripened inju-
ries. 9 The argument from a deterrence perspective, perhaps, is a
better argument for modifying the common law to permit inchoate
torts, but then it is hardly clear why a legislator would rationally se-
lect an agenda of private rights of action for persons who were put
at risk but not otherwise harmed. If the risk creation problem is
significant enough to capture legislative attention and warrant leg-
islative action, why would a legislator think that the right response
is to regulate the risk through tort plaintiffs as opposed to regula-
tors and criminal prosecutors? At a minimum, one must consider
an array of policy issues before concluding that legislative modifi-
cation of the common law to recognize inchoate torts is the most
promising path for regulation.'
" Buckley, 521 U.S. at 443-44.
6oSee Goldberg & Zipursky, Concern for Cause, supra note 6, at 1419 (arguing that
a proposed plan to allocate compensatory payments by gun manufacturers to shooting
victims by reference to risk exposure gives inadequate consideration to a number of
critical policy factors).
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II. WHEN Is HEIGHTENED RISK A COGNIZABLE INJURY?
It is important to be clear about what the preceding argument
has established, and what it has not. We have argued that, once tort
law is properly conceptualized as a law of civil recourse, the notion
of an inchoate tort becomes a self-contradiction. An inchoate
wrong does not generate tort liability. Moreover, we have argued
that the tort law's refusal to recognize inchoate wrongs, although
somewhat mysterious on standard deterrence models, is quite intel-
ligible on the civil recourse model. It is precisely because tort law is
a law of civil recourse that plaintiffs may not invoke the machinery
of the state to complain about wrongs that generate unrealized and
unrealizable risks to them.
In arguing these points, it has not yet been established that en-
hanced-risk cases, such as suits complaining of heightened risk of
cancer from exposure to a known carcinogen, must fail. To say that
there are no inchoate torts is not to say that increased-risk claims
are necessarily claims for inchoate torts. Indeed, such claims can
be, and are typically, cast in a manner to indicate that a defendant's
wrong has been realized, that is, that a plaintiff has suffered an in-
jury.6 First, they may be cast to allege that the defendant's miscon-
duct harmed the plaintiff simply by exposing the plaintiff to a still-
extant risk of bodily harm or illness. Second, they may be cast to
allege that the defendant's misconduct resulted in the realization of
an injury, albeit not the illness risked by the exposure to the toxin.
In short, the argument is that heightened risk is actionable because
it is linked to another, realized injury, usually emotional distress or
economic loss.
For reasons that will become clear, we refer to the harm associ-
ated solely with being subjected to a heightened risk of physical
harm-a risk that is unaccompanied by any other realized injury-
as an intermediate or unripened harm, in contrast to more tradi-
tionally recognized injuries as ultimate or target harms. Traumatic
bodily harm and illness are the paradigmatic forms of ultimate
harm. Emotional distress and economic loss, however, can also
count as ultimate harms. This Part briefly analyzes attempts to
frame claims for exposure to heightened risk of illness as claims
61 See supra text accompanying notes 11-12.
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seeking compensation only for the intermediate harm of increased
risk of illness.
Some have argued forcefully that, in and of itself, exposure to
heightened risk of physical harm is not a harm to the person ex-
posed.' For purposes of this Article, however, we assume that ex-
posure to increased risk can be regarded as in and of itself a loss of
welfare to the person(s) placed at heightened risk. Whether correct
or incorrect, this assumption strikes many as intuitive. For exam-
ple, imagine that person P is given a choice, ex ante, between two
states of affairs, S, and S2 In S, P has a 2% risk of developing lung
cancer. In S2, P has a 10% risk of developing lung cancer. Other-
wise, S, and S2 are identical. Presumably, P will choose S, This ex-
ample suggests to some that it is intelligible to talk about height-
ened risk of physical harm or illness as a harm to the person
exposed to the heightened risk.
Nonetheless, even if we assume that heightened risk is a harm, it
does not follow that this harm is an injury, that is, a cognizable
harm.63 In fact, the common law of negligence typically does not
treat such harm as cognizable, as can be shown by offering modifi-
cations of the examples provided earlier in connection with the dis-
cussion of inchoate wrongs. Suppose a variation of Vaughn v.
Menlove, in which Menlove has carelessly built the haystack on his
property, increasing by 5% the likelihood that Vaughn's house will
suffer fire damage as compared to the risk without the negligently
constructed haystack. Even today, if Vaughn were to sue Menlove
in negligence seeking compensation for the harm of heightened
risk of property damage his suit would presumably fail. Unless the
heightened risk ripens into the target harm of actual fire damage to
person or property in the case of negligence, or the harm of inter-
ference with use and enjoyment of property recognized in the tort
of nuisance-there is no cause of action. Of itself, the intermediate
harm is not actionable.
The same reasoning applies to the shopping mall example. Sup-
pose that mall owner M continues to operate his mall in a manner
6 E.g., Hurd, supra note 42, at 263-64; Stephen R. Perry, Risk, Harm and Responsi-
bility, in Philosophical Foundations of Tort Law 321, 330-39 (David G. Owen ed.,
1995).
6 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 902 cmt. a (1979) (explaining the in-
jury/harm distinction).
2002] 1651
Virginia Law Review
that carelessly generates a heightened risk to patrons of being at-
tacked by a third party (for example, because of poor lighting, the
absence of adequate fencing, lack of security patrols, etc.). Even
granted that each patron is in some sense harmed by the height-
ened risk of attack, until such time as a patron is attacked, there is
no cause of action. These examples could readily be multiplied.
To say that the common law of tort does not treat pure height-
ened risk of physical harm as a cognizable harm by itself, of course,
invites the question: "Why not?" The answer is part of a compli-
cated story, too complicated to be analyzed in depth here. Essen-
tially, we believe that the explanation lies in a proper conceptuali-
zation of the duty element of the negligence tort. The duty of care
owed in most instances of actionable negligence is a duty to take
care to avoid causing an ultimate harm, such as physical injury or
property damage, not a duty to take care to avoid causing the in-
termediate harm of heightened risk. It is a duty to take care not to
injure, rather than a duty to take care not to engage in injurious
conduct (that is conduct that risks causing an ultimate injury).64
This explanation, minimal as it is, will likely strike many readers
as circular, but we do not think that it is. In our view, intermediate
harms are not cognizable because the duties of care recognized by
negligence law are almost always duties to avoid causing ultimate,
not intermediate harms. Yet this argument invites a further ques-
tion: Why does the common law of negligence rely on and enforce
duties to avoid ultimate injuries rather than duties to avoid poten-
tially injurious conduct? At least in theory, negligence could be
built around duties to avoid causing risks of harm, although it has
not. Likewise, negligence law could recognize a cause of action
where the defendant breaches a duty not to cause a recognized ul-
timate injury even if the plaintiff can only demonstrate having suf-
fered an unripened version of that injury. Yet it does neither of
these things. Why not?
The answer to this question is over-determined by considera-
tions of pragmatism and principle. First, as courts have noted, a
system that permitted suits for intermediate harms would invite all
64 Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 217-21.
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sorts of administrative headaches. 5 The volume of litigation would
presumably increase substantially simply because many more per-
sons are exposed to risk than suffer a realized risk of harm. So, too,
redundant litigations would increase if persons were required first
to litigate their increased risk claims, only to have to return to
court years later to make out a claim when the risk is realized. In-
deed, the concern for redundant and burdensome litigation under-
writes the traditional rule against "claim splitting," which requires
a plaintiff to bring all claims for injury caused by the same tortious
conduct in one suit.' While courts have adjusted this rule in certain
contexts, particularly in conjunction with medical monitoring
claims,67 the move to a general regime in which claims for enhanced
risk are routinely separated out from claims of ultimate harm
would seem to threaten a massive increase in administrative costs.
Second, until an ultimate harm has happened, decisionmakers
will often have poor information about the risks in question, which
means they will have a harder time than they already do in deter-
mining whether conduct should even be deemed careless, and, if
so, how much compensation is owed to the plaintiff.' The experi-
ence of the fire damage or the parking lot attack, unfortunately, is
often necessary to provide critical information regarding what pre-
cautions ought to be taken. This is not to deny that breach and
damages pose problems of proof under the current system of liabil-
ity for breaches of duties of non-injury. But the gravity of these
problems would likely reach another order of magnitude were
claims of intermediate harms rendered actionable.
6 Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1232 (D. Mass. 1986) (noting
that it would be unsound policy to encourage lawsuits in anticipation of grave disease)
(citing Gore v. Daniel O'Connell's Sons, Inc., 461 N.E.2d 256, 259 (Mass. App. Ct.
1984)).
66 Kara L. McCall, Comment, Medical Monitoring Plaintiffs and Subsequent Claims
for Disease, 66 U. Chi. L. Rev. 969 (1999) (noting the rule against claim splitting and
arguing against its application to certain injuries).
See id. at 983.
See Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 307 (N.J. 1987) ("A holding that
recognizes a cause of action for unquantified enhanced risk claims.., imposes on
judges and juries the burden of assessing damages for the risk of potential disease,
without clear guidelines to determine what level of compensation may be appropri-
ate.").
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Third, as Justice Breyer noted in Buckley, recognition of claims
for intermediate harm creates serious prioritization concerns.69 For
any case in which the defendant has insufficient funds to pay all
claims for intermediate and ultimate harms, it is likely that the
former will frequently be compensated at the expense of the latter,
simply because the former will arise earlier in time.
Fourth, and somewhat more speculatively, a system that recog-
nized as actionable not only duties not to cause physical injury, but
also duties not to cause various increments of risk of physical injury
would potentially create undue de facto burdens on citizens' free-
dom of action. There is a sense in which each of us benefits from
tort law being restricted to the enforcement of duties to take care
not to cause ultimate harms. In this sense, tort law's notorious tol-
erance of so-called "moral luck"-the fact that, for reasons outside
a wrongdoer's control, some wrongs ripen into injuries and result
in liability whereas other identical wrongs do not ripen and do not
result in liability-is not a tolerance for luck at all. Rather, it is a
justified feature of a legal scheme concerned with recognizing lib-
erty of action. It may be that, from certain moral perspectives,
identical acts of careless driving, one of which ripens into a tort, the
other of which does not, are equally deserving of sanction. Hence,
from those perspectives, there is an element of arbitrariness as to
when tort liability attaches.' But viewed from the standpoint of
liberal political theory, the insistence on realization is not arbitrary.
Rather, it harnesses chance to create a kind of buffer zone for free
action: Unless and until injurious conduct actually causes an ulti-
mate harm, it is not subject to sanction through a privately com-
menced lawsuit.7 In this regard, the employment of duties of non-
injury in tort is akin to the rule against prior restraint of speech: It
serves as a prophylactic by permitting a certain amount of undesir-
able conduct in order to ensure that liberty is preserved. Experien-
69 Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442-44; see also Mark Geistfeld, The Analytics of Duty:
Medical Monitoring and Related Forms of Economic Loss, 88 Va. L. Rev. 1921, 1942-
43 (2002) (analyzing prioritization concerns).
70 Christopher H. Schroeder, Corrective Justice, Liability for Risks, and Tort Law,
38 UCLA L. Rev. 143, 150 (1990).
" Cf. Arthur Ripstein, Equality, Responsibility, and the Law 84 (1999) (suggesting
that the problem of moral luck dissipates when tort is examined from a political-
theory perspective); Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 221-25, 229-31 (rebutting
Professor Schroeder's critique of the injury requirement as arbitrary).
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tially, this appears intuitive: Most people take advantage of the
buffer zone created in part by the requirement of ultimate harm at
one time or another, for example, by occasionally driving unrea-
sonably. A system in which litigation could be instituted by anyone
put at risk by allegedly unreasonable conduct would likely be seen
and felt as burdensome, if not intolerable.
The latter suggestion about tort law's general refusal to recog-
nize intermediate harms might be thought vulnerable to the follow-
ing objection. As noted above, conduct of a harmful nature that
does not cause an ultimate injury can be regulated through crimi-
nal and administrative law. In what way can it be a problem in lib-
eral political theory to attach tort liability to such conduct? Again,
however, this objection fails to appreciate the significance of the
identity of the party seeking the sanction. Criminal and administra-
tive law empower the government to place restraints on liberty by
means of processes that, at least compared to the processes of tort
law, tend to provide a certain degree of political accountability.
This is most obvious in the case of democratically enacted legisla-
tion and notice-and-comment rulemaking, but it is also true to a
certain extent of prosecutorial and regulatory decisionmaking.
Prosecutors and administrators are informally accountable for their
decisions to prosecute and, more significantly, face various legal
and political constraints on how they exercise their power. By con-
trast, tort suits, particularly in a contingent fee system, are initiated
by private actors who are unconstrained and unaccountable to
anyone. Indeed, it is in many respects a great virtue of the tort sys-
tem that a private plaintiff, at least, needs no one's permission to
initiate a lawsuit. Moreover, she "prosecutes" her suit under legal
standards less onerous than those of the criminal law. Precisely be-
cause it is so easy, in a political sense, to proceed with a claim in
tort, a liberal regime will be cautious when arming individuals with
the power to sue, lest suits become too prevalent and too invasive.'
7 This point may help elucidate the emergence, within the Rehnquist era, of the
constitutional jurisprudence of punitive damages. The current Justices tend to treat
punitive damages primarily as a device for deterring future wrongful conduct through
private lawsuits. Thus, to permit them is to permit regulation without ordinary politi-
cal checks. To compensate for the absence of such checks, the Court has thus required
beefed-up procedures after the initiation of the suit, as well as aggressive judicial re-
view of the jury's damage award. See, e.g., Cooper Indus. v. Leatherman Tool Group,
532 U.S. 424, 431 (2001) (calling for de novo appellate review of juries' punitive dam-
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Hence it is plausible to demand of tort plaintiffs, but not the gov-
ernment, that, ordinarily, they must await an ultimate injury before
commencing suit.
Having offered these mostly suggestive remarks, we should also
acknowledge the existence of what some might take to be excep-
tions to the rule requiring the plaintiff to have suffered an ultimate
harm. Most significant are the so-called "loss of chance" cases.73 As
Professor Wex Malone noted fifty years ago, some courts early in
the twentieth century began to relax the requirement of proof of
causation in certain tort cases, including, for example, Jones Act
cases involving suits by the survivors of drowned sailors claiming
that a shipowner was negligent in failing to provide for, or under-
take, a reasonable rescue effort.74 Many of these incidents took
place in stormy seas, and hours might have passed before the ab-
sence of the overboard sailor was noticed. For these and other rea-
sons, plaintiffs had difficulty proving by a preponderance of the
evidence that, had a given shipowner taken reasonable steps to res-
cue, a given sailor would have been saved.75 In fact, the far more
likely outcome was that no rescue would have occurred.
Faced with such cases, some courts began to reconceive the in-
jury of which the sailors' survivors were complaining. The suits,
they reasoned, were not seeking compensation for the death ex-
actly, but for the sailors' "loss of a chance" of survival. The ship-
owner, as it were, was obligated to provide the sailors with what-
ever chance they had to live. Some courts expressed this idea in
terms of a nontraditional duty to avoid causing intermediate harm.
For example, the majority opinion in Gardner v. National Bulk
Carriers reasoned that the shipowner owed to the sailor a "positive
duty to make a sincere attempt at rescue."'76 On this account, "cau-
sation is proved if the [shipowner's] omission destroys the reason-
able possibility of rescue."'
age awards); Honda Motor Co. v. Oberg, 512 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1994) (expressing
concern over the lack of procedural checks on punitive damages).
73 See Dobbs, supra note 19, § 178, at 434-38.74 Wex S. Malone, Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 Stan. L. Rev. 60, 72-81 (1956).
' Dobbs, supra note 19, § 178, at 434-35 (describing the problem of proof to which
the "loss of chance" doctrine is a response).76310 F.2d 284, 287 (3d Cir. 1962).
7Id.
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In more recent years, the loss of a chance idea has been ex-
tended by some courts to the medical malpractice setting. 8 In the
typical case, a physician negligently fails to diagnose a progressive
disease, such as cancer, in her patient. Later, the patient learns of
the condition, by which time the disease has worsened, lowering
her chances of recovery. It turns out, however, that the odds of her
surviving the disease were less than 50% to begin with, so that even
if the patient had been properly diagnosed and treatment had been
commenced earlier, she still likely would have died. Thus, if the pa-
tient dies, her surviving family members cannot bring a wrongful
death claim, because they cannot prove that, had the doctor exer-
cised due care, it is more likely than not that the patient would
have lived. All that can be shown is that the doctor's carelessness
reduced her chance of recovery by a certain amount (say, from
40% to 20%). Again, at least some of the courts that have permit-
ted causes of action in similar scenarios have done so by reconcep-
tualizing the doctor's duty from a duty to take care not to cause an
ultimate injury (death) to a duty to take care not to diminish the
plaintiff's chances of survival.79 For example, in Falcon v. Memorial
Hospital, the majority reasoned in part as follows:
We thus see the injury resulting from medical malpractice as
not only, or necessarily, physical harm, but also as including the
loss of opportunity of avoiding physical harm. A patient goes to a
physician precisely to improve his opportunities of avoiding,
ameliorating, or reducing physical harm and pain and suffering.'
If loss of chance cases such as Gardner and Falcon could be
fairly characterized as the "camel's nose" for a revolution in tort
law under which duties of non-injury were transformed, across the
board, into duties of non-injuriousness, then this Part's argument
might be in jeopardy. That has not been the case, however, and this
account may help explain why." Here, it is vital to realize that even
's See Dobbs, supra note 19, § 178, at 434-35.
79 Id.
0 462 N.W.2d 44, 52 (Mich. 1990), superseded by statute, as stated in Weymers v.
Khera, 563 N.W.2d 647, 652-53 (Mich. 1997) (en banc).
"' See Dobbs, supra note 19, § 178, at 435 (noting decisions refusing to recognize loss
of chance claims where causation cannot be proven by a preponderance of the evi-
dence).
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those courts that have recognized loss of chance claims have only
done so if two conditions are present. First, loss of chance has al-
ways been recognized as a second-best solution for dealing with
claims by persons who have in fact suffered a physical injury or
death. In other words, loss-of-chance theories have been developed
in response to perceived inequities faced by certain tort plaintiffs
who have demonstrably suffered ultimate injuries, but face a par-
ticular sort of difficulty in proving causation. Put simply, there is no
occasion to engage in loss-of-chance analysis unless a class of in-
jured plaintiffs faces a systematic inability to prove that the negli-
gent acts of members of an identifiable class of defendants caused
them injury. The recasting of the duty in these cases as a duty of
non-injuriousness rather than non-injury only occurs because, in
the absence of the recasting, an entire class of plaintiffs will be de-
nied all recovery, and an entire class of wrongdoers, some of whose
wrongdoings ripened into injury, will be left free of all liability. In
this respect, loss of chance resembles the device of market share li-
ability, by which the courts shift the burden of proof of causation
because there is no information as to which among multiple manu-
facturers caused a particular plaintiff's injuries.'
Second, the epistemic problem (systemic absence of proof of
causation) is a necessary, but not sufficient, condition for reconcep-
tualizing the duty in the loss-of-chance cases.' In addition, courts
have required that the original duty of non-injury contain or sup-
port something in the nature of an affirmative duty to assist or pro-
tect, rather than a purely negative duty to refrain from engaging in
risky conduct. Where the original duty of non-injury includes af-
firmative-duty components, it makes particular sense, in light of
the proof problems discussed above, to treat loss of opportunity as
a cognizable harm. Again, to quote the Falcon opinion:
A woman who engages the services of a physician ... does so to
reduce pain and suffering and to increase the likelihood of her
surviving and the child surviving childbirth in a good state of
health even though the likelihood of the woman and child not
surviving in good health without such services is far less than fifty
See Ripstein & Zipursky, supra note 6, at 231-37.
83 Dobbs, supra note 19, § 179, at 438-39 (noting the limited contexts in which duty
is imposed).
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percent. That is why women go to physicians. That is what physi-
cians undertake to do. That is what they are paid for.84
In other words, it is plausible to characterize the doctor-patient
relationship as including an affirmative duty on the part of the doc-
tor to take steps to give her patient every chance to recover, not
just to take care to avoid causing those injuries.' Ordinarily, this
aspect of the duty of care owed by a doctor to his patient is merely
implicit within an allegation of malpractice. If, for example, an OB-
GYN neglects to follow reasonable procedures, such as failing to
determine the Rh status of mother and baby, a claim alleging that
an ultimate harm resulted from the malpractice will not rely upon
or highlight this affirmative aspect of the physician's duty. In other
words, a failure to follow basic standards of reasonable care is al-
ways a breach of the stronger affirmative duty to take care to
maximize the chances of a good outcome. Sometimes, however, if
it is impossible for the plaintiff to establish a breach of the duty to
take care not to cause physical injury, the affirmative nature of the
physician's duty emerges or is highlighted. Its residual component
is revealed, supporting a claim for breach of the duty to provide the
patient with the best chance for survival. By contrast, for example,
Menlove's duty to his neighbor Vaughn, being strictly a negative
duty, contains no such residual affirmative duty. Thus if Vaughn
somehow could not prove that Menlove's negligence probably
caused his house to burn down, Vaughn likely would not be able to
resort to the second-best argument that Menlove had injured him
by increasing the risk that his house would burn down.
The foregoing analysis of loss-of-chance cases is admittedly sug-
gestive rather than comprehensive. It is offered only to show that,
in recognizing pockets of liability for loss of chance, courts have
not committed themselves (and need not commit themselves) to
the recognition of "risk" as a cognizable harm. Recovery for loss of
chance, in other words, is not recovery for heightened risk, rather it
Falcon, 462 N.W.2d at 52.
8 See Goldberg & Zipursky, Concern for Cause, supra note 6, at 1416-17. In our
view, then, it is probably incorrect to describe the loss-of-chance cases as permitting
recovery for increased risk of harm. Professor Perry has argued that they permit re-
covery for loss of an opportunity to obtain adequate treatment. See Perry, supra note
62, at339.
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is recovery for breach of a special kind of affirmative duty, on the
occasion of a full-fledged physical injury.
III. RISK OF FUTURE INJURY AND THE LAW OF
EMOTIONAL DISTRESS
Thus far we have argued that claims for future injury are not
well framed in negligence either as claims for inchoate wrongs, or
as claims for the harm of having been exposed to risk of physical
injury. Although this discussion has been necessary to clarify the
issues at stake, it likely will read to many as an extended prelude.
As noted in the introduction, lawyers and judges tend not to ana-
lyze claims for heightened risk along the lines thus far discussed,
although they might unwittingly slip into such analysis. Rather,
they are much more likely to analyze such claims under the catego-
ries of negligent infliction of emotional distress ("NIED") and neg-
ligence causing pure economic loss. We now turn to examine the
former category, commencing with a brief review of the state of
current doctrine.
A. The Current State of Emotional Distress Doctrine
1. Basic Doctrine
Although it is regularly employed in ordinary academic dis-
course, the use of NIED as a category of negligence liability has
always been awkward. The last century did, of course, witness im-
portant expansions of liability in cases where the primary com-
pensable injury consisted of a plaintiff's emotional distress. 6 None-
theless, analysis of this area is rife with confusion.
The most fundamental confusions arise from the tendency
among scholars and judges to conceive of NIED as permitting re-
covery for "pure" emotional distress. To be sure, this usage is help-
ful in that it starkly contrasts NIED claims from cases in which the
plaintiff is compensated for pain and suffering and other forms of
distress that attend a physical harm caused by defendant's care-
lessness. The latter sort of case is by far the more common case in
86 Dobbs, supra note 19, § 308, at 836.
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which emotional distress is compensated.' To take a contemporary
example, plaintiffs who are able to prove that a defendant's negli-
gence in exposing them to asbestos caused them to develop meso-
thelioma are typically permitted to recover for fears concerning
their future health as part of the general emotional distress associ-
ated with having mesothelioma. This is a special case of the more
general rule holding that emotional distress is not generally suffi-
cient to count as the predicate injury in a negligence case, but is
compensable if parasitic upon a proven physical injury.
The problem with referring to suits that seek compensation for
emotional distress that is not parasitic on a physical harm as claims
for "pure" emotional distress is that the term "pure" connotes the
absence not just of a predicate physical harm, but of any other
harm-including consequent physical harm, as well as predicate in-
tangible harm, such as the harm of being deprived of one's liberty
of movement. It further suggests that that emotional distress, like
physical harm, should be conceived of as a harm unmediated by
the immediate circumstances giving rise to the distress.' Both of
these connotations are unfortunate because, under current law,
cognizable claims for emotional distress that are not parasitic on a
physical harm are rarely "pure" in these ways. The phrase "pure
emotional distress" suggests an orbit of duty and liability that is
much broader than any recognized under current law. It also fails
to capture what is most salient about the situations in which courts
do permit such claims to go forward.
Consider the so-called "fright" or "zone of danger" cases, men-
tioned in the introductory discussion of the Supreme Court's deci-
' Id. § 302, at 822 ("Far and away the most common claims of emotional distress...
are those associated with personal injury actions.").
Physical harm is "unmediated" in that the immediate circumstances giving rise to
the physical harm are always the same-the interaction of some force or agent with
the plaintiff's body. Thus, if B acts carelessly toward A so as to proximately cause A
to suffer a broken leg, it doesn't matter whether the break was caused because B
knocked A over, committed malpractice on A, or furnished A with a bone-dissolving
drug. By contrast, as we explain below, when A sues for negligence causing emotional
distress, it matters very much to A's chances of recovery how that distress was in-
duced. In many jurisdictions, for example, absent a special relationship between A
and B, if A's emotional distress did not result from B's carelessness causing A to ap-
prehend imminent harmful bodily contact, A cannot recover from B.
2002] 1661
1662 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 88:1625
sion in Consolidated Rail Corp. v. Gottshall.' To understand the
scope of the fright doctrine, one must first appreciate two older
doctrines it was developed to supplant. The first served as a broad
bar to emotional distress claims and provided that a physical injury
or illness brought about by fear, anxiety, or shock could never
count as having been proximately caused by a defendant's negli-
gent act.9° As a matter of law, the connection between the negli-
gence and injury was deemed in these cases to be too attenuated.
The second doctrine, which was designed in some ways to blunt the
force of the proximate cause rule, held that any impact or bodily
touching, no matter how minimal, would count as a predicate
physical injury.9' Under this pair of rules, which was in place in the
late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, a plaintiff who was
subject to the least touching as a result of the defendant's negli-
gence could recover even if all of her claimed damages were for
emotional distress, whereas a person subjected to a traumatic epi-
sode in which she was not touched recovered nothing.'
Dissatisfied with this exercise in line-drawing, courts in the mid-
twentieth century came to recognize a cause of action for negligent
infliction of physical injury through fright. To make out such a
claim, the plaintiff is typically required to prove that the defen-
dant's negligence (a) caused the plaintiff to apprehend that she was
in danger of imminent bodily harm, and (b) that this apprehension
in turn manifested itself in a physical injury such as a miscarriage
" See supra text accompanying notes 16-21 (discussing the Court's application of
Gottshall in Buckley).
'The classic analysis and critique of this proximate cause argument is Frances H.
Bohlen, Right to Recover for Injury Resulting from Negligence Without Impact, 50
Am. L. Reg. 141 (1902), reprinted in Frances H. Bohlen, Studies in the Law of Torts
252-90 (1926); see also Battala v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731-32 (N.Y. 1961) (criticiz-
ing the public policy reasons given for denying no-impact emotional harm claims).
I See William L. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 34, at 214 (1941).
'The poster child for the inaptness of the regime created by combining the proxi-
mate cause and impact rules was Mitchell v. Rochester Railway. Co., 45 N.E. 354, 355
(N.Y. 1896), overruled by Battala v. State, 176 N.E.2d 729, 731-32 (N.Y. 1961), which
denied recovery to a woman who suffered a miscarriage allegedly as a result of the
serious fright she received when defendant's runaway horse nearly ran her over, but
did not actually touch her. See Prosser, supra note 91, § 34, at 214-15 (discussing
Mitchell's "untenable notions of causal connection" while lampooning the proximate
cause and impact rules).
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or diagnosable illness.' As the Second Restatement emphasizes,
courts permitting recovery in the fright cases have generally not
taken themselves to be recognizing a cause of action for "pure"
emotional distress.' Instead, they permit claims for physical ill-
nesses that are generated through the particular mental medium of
fright. In this respect, the fright causes of action were primarily a
repudiation of the old proximate cause doctrine. This repudiation,
it was hoped, that would largely obviate the need to rely on the
crude counterweight of the impact rule. Buckley itself confirms this
understanding of the fright cases by ruling, in effect, that, once
Gottshall recognized a cause of action for fright arising under
FELA, there was no longer a need to permit claims based on not-
presently-harmful impact with asbestos dust.' Instead, a plaintiff
must either seek damages for emotional distress parasitic on a
genuine physical injury or illness, or he must make out a claim for
negligent infliction of physical harm through fright.'
In the predicate physical injury and fright cases, which have, un-
til recently, made up the vast bulk of cases in which a victim of neg-
ligence has received compensation for emotional distress, the dis-
tress is compensable, but not in itself actionable. Nevertheless,
courts do purport to recognize two pockets of liability for "pure"
emotional distress. First, there are the so-called "bystander" cases.
These permit recovery for emotional injury to the plaintiff that oc-
curs when a plaintiff observes firsthand the defendant negligently
injuring her spouse, child, or other close relativeY As originally
conceived, these bystander claims, too, appear to have been under-
stood as claims for physical injury or illness caused through the
medium of nervous shock.' However, courts have more recently
93 See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 379 P.2d 513, 515 (Cal. 1963)
(noting that fright causes of action must include allegation of "consequent bodily ill-
ness"), overruled on other grounds, Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 925 (Cal. 1968).
9 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 313(1) (1965) (noting that the action is for emo-
tional distress resulting in illness or bodily harm); id. § 313(1) cmt. a ("[Tihis section
does not give protection to mental and emotional tranquility in itself.").
9* See Buckley, 521 U.S. at 429-30 (rejecting the impact associated with dust inhala-
tion as sufficient to support an award of emotional distress damages).
'See supra text accompanying notes 12-21 (discussing Buckley's rejection of the
plaintiff's NIED claim).
Dobbs, supra note 19, § 309, at 839-41.
E.g., Dillon v. Legg, 441 P.2d 912, 920 (Cal. 1968) (permitting bystander recovery,
but confining its holding to instances of wrongful conduct causing physical injury).
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suggested that they are in fact claims for "pure" emotional dis-
tress." Essentially, they allow relatives standing just outside the
zone of danger to recover for their distress, even though they were
not concerned for their own physical well being.
Second, liability attaches for emotional distress when the negli-
gent conduct occurs within the context of certain "special relation-
ships." The key factor is that the situation in which the parties in-
teract attests that the defendant implicitly undertook to be vigilant
of the emotional well-being of the plaintiff."° Thus, doctors and
therapists have been held liable for negligently distressing their pa-
tients. ' Likewise, morticians have been held liable for upsetting
family members by mishandling of the decedent's corpse.'" In
older cases, telegraph companies were held liable for being careless
in falsely informing the recipient of a family member's death, or in
failing to deliver a death telegram to the decedent's relative,
thereby denying him or her the opportunity to attend the dece-
dent's funeral. 3
2. Fear-of-Disease Doctrine
The fear-of-disease cases have emerged in the last fifteen years
against this doctrinal backdrop. In many jurisdictions, they have
caused something of a throwback as courts have once again begun
to invoke the old "impact" rule. Like their nineteenth-century
predecessors, these courts do so as a way of simultaneously deny-
99 E.g., Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814, 829-30 (Cal. 1989). Even thus cast, one may
doubt that these are really actions for the wrong of carelessly causing another to suf-
fer emotional distress. Indeed, in our view, bystander claims are best understood as
judicial extensions of "derivative" actions for wrongful death and loss of consortium,
whereby a plaintiff in a familial relationship with the victim of another's negligence is
granted a special dispensation to sue as the vicarious beneficiary of a wrong causing
physical harm to the victim. See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Rights, Wrongs and Recourse
in the Law of Torts, 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1, 28-29 (1998) (suggesting that courts in emo-
tional distress cases sometimes grant "standing" to those who have not been wronged
by the defendant).
'0 Dobbs, supra note 19, § 308, at 836-37.
... Id. § 312, at 849-50.
'Id. § 308, at 836-37.
',3Id. In our view, these special relationship cases are perhaps the only true in-
stances of liability for "pure" emotional distress: This sort of plaintiff fairly complains
that the defendant breached a duty to be vigilant of the plaintiff's interest in emo-
tional well-being tout court.
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ing "pure" NEED claims while watering down the predicate physi-
cal injury requirement, thus permitting readier recovery of emo-
tional distress damages as "parasitic" on a mere touching. In some
states, for example, a plaintiff can recover for fear of cancer if she
can prove that the defendant's negligent conduct caused a physical
impact upon her, in addition to causing her fear of cancer."
A second variation, closely related to the revival of the impact
rule, involves conferring legal significance on subcellular changes
or changes to the immune system. Here, the physical changes are
neither the predicate injury nor the consequent injury, but rather
the physical realization of the risk factors caused by defendant's
negligence. While these physical changes themselves do not dimin-
ish plaintiff's physical functioning or cause pain or discomfort, they
are deemed cognizable harms of a sort that will support recovery
for emotional distress over the fear of future illness. °5
Other jurisdictions have taken a rather different approach, re-
quiring a consequent physical symptom or manifestation of emo-
tional harm (such as fear or fright) in order to recover for the fear
itself. These differ from the "fright" cases, in that they do not con-
ceive of the plaintiff as seeking compensation for physical injury
consequent on emotional trauma. They also differ from the predi-
cate injury cases in that the tort is not thought of as the negligent
causing of the physical injury, but as the negligent causing of fear
of disease. Instead, the symptom or manifestation serves an eviden-
tiary role, one that attests to the sincerity and gravity of the claim
for emotional distress damages."
Still other courts hold that a plaintiff cannot recover for fear of
disease without proof that she was actually exposed to the carcino-
genic or pathogenic agent (as opposed to merely having been
touched, which would trigger liability under the impact rule). This
variation is sometimes applied in fear-of-cancer or fear-of-hepatitis
cases, but it is particularly common in fear-of-AIDS cases. Indeed,
" Adams v. Clean Air Sys., 586 N.E.2d 940, 942 (Ind. Ct. App. 1992); see also
Sanders v. Brown, 343 S.E.2d 722 (Ga. Ct. App. 1986) (stating the impact rule in a
pesticide exposure case).
"' See, e.g., Anderson v. W.R. Grace & Co., 628 F. Supp. 1219, 1226-27 (D. Mass.
1986) (holding that subcellular changes are adequate to support a NIED claim).
""First Nat'l Bank v. Drier, 574 N.W.2d 597, 600 (S.D. 1998) (requiring objective
symptomology).
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fear-of-AIDS plaintiffs are typically required to prove that they
were exposed to HIV under conditions that would have made its
transmission possible. °7
A fifth and less physically focused rule is found in the California
Supreme Court's prominent opinion in Potter v. Firestone Tire and
Rubber Co." Plaintiffs in that case argued that they should be able
to recover from Firestone, which had regularly disposed of toxic
waste in a landfill near their homes, causing them a substantially
increased risk of cancer." Firestone argued that since there was no
proven physical injury, there could be no recovery."' The Califor-
nia Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could recover in negligence
for fear of cancer without predicate physical injury or physical im-
pact, but only if they could prove that it was likelier than not that
they would develop the disease."' The rationale for adapting what
appeared to be a test for the cause-in-fact requirement was, in the
first instance, the observation that fear of illness ought to be rea-
sonable before being compensable. Of course, the court also ad-
verted to the need to control a potential flood of litigation, as well
as the need for objective criteria to prevent fraud."2
Finally, a small number of courts have rejected bright-line rules
entirely in this area, and instead adopted standards aimed to evalu-
ate directly the strength of each plaintiff's claims. Hence, for ex-
ample, some courts will look for strong evidence of the seriousness
of the emotional distress; some courts will look hard at the reason-
ableness of the particular plaintiff's fear; some courts will ask-as
in traditional intentional infliction of emotional distress cases-
whether the distress in question was more than a normally consti-
tuted person could be expected to endure."3
'
7 Dobbs, supra note 19, § 311, at 845 (noting that courts presented with fear-of-
AIDS claims "usually" require evidence of exposure).
.. 863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
'09 Id. at 801.
"o Id. at 803.
.. Id. at 816. The plaintiffs had not met the more likely than not standard, but the
court remanded the case for a determination of whether Firestone could be held li-
able on the alternative theory of intentional infliction of emotional distress. Id. at 827.
"' Id. at 816.
13 See, e.g., Williams v. Warren Gen. Hosp., 684 N.E.2d 730, 733 (Ohio Ct. App.
1996) (permitting recovery where distress is severe and debilitating).
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As numerous courts and scholars have indicated (and this con-
ference attests), the law of "fear of disease" and "fear of injury"
warrants close evaluation and thoughtful development. The courts
are casting about for a sensible way of framing these claims, and
have adopted divergent approaches. Moreover, many of the stan-
dards currently in use cry out for scrutiny and skepticism. The re-
vival of the physical impact rule, for example, is a glaring illustra-
tion of doctrine that is forced and formalistic. Likewise, the Potter
court's likelier-than-not rule is intuitively unsound. More generally,
these cases raise basic questions about negligence law. Does the
basic distinction between predicate injury and parasitic damages
make sense? How ought courts handle the problems of hypersensi-
tive plaintiffs, too much litigation, and the threat of fraudulent
claims?
This Part first criticizes the ways in which many scholars and
courts conceptualize fear of injury and emotional distress claims
more generally. The basic point is that courts use concepts that are
insufficiently robust and nuanced to permit the emergence of a co-
herent doctrine with respect to claims for negligence causing emo-
tional distress. In their place, we propose an alternative way of
conceptualizing these cases in terms of a duty to take care to avoid
placing plaintiffs in certain kinds of threatening situations. Finally,
we offer some reasons for thinking that this understanding will be
useful to courts faced with the practical question of how to dispose
of fear-of-injury cases.
B. The Current Conceptualization of Emotional Distress Claims
As previously discussed, many of the lines drawn by the courts
seem at first blush arbitrary and indefensible. Why must a fear-of-
AIDS claimant prove actual exposure to HIV if, for example, she
has reasonable grounds for such fear? Why, in Potter, did the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court require a fear-of-cancer claimant to prove
that his fear was grounded in a "more likely than not" probability
that he will develop the disease? The trouble stems in part from
the impoverished conceptual framework employed by most schol-
ars and many courts to analyze negligence claims. This framework
is neither troubled by, nor helpful in overcoming, these instances of
arbitrariness. Indeed, for reasons that we now explore, the frame-
work suggests that courts have no choice but to draw arbitrary lines
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in the area of negligent infliction of emotional distress. On this ac-
count, about the most one can hope for in this area is that the
courts will be candid in acknowledging the arbitrariness of their
rules, as the California Supreme Court sometimes has been."'
The standard conceptualization starts from an intuitive premise.
Indeed, its intuitiveness is precisely why the framework has be-
come standard. We label it the "equivalence-of-harms" thesis (the
"equivalence" thesis, for short). It asserts that, to the victim who
experiences the harm, the type of harm-as opposed to its magni-
tude or severity-is irrelevant."5 Assuming each of several types of
harm on the same order of magnitude, there is no normative dis-
tinction to be drawn between them. Insofar as tort law is con-
cerned, there is no essential difference between traumatic physical
injury, illness, or psychic distress. Simply put, harm is harm is
harm. 116
Under the equivalence thesis, tort law generally, and negligence
law in particular, appear facially odd and thus badly in need of ex-
planation or reform. Both have long divided up the liability uni-
verse along the lines rejected as incoherent by the equivalence the-
sis. As previously seen, courts have long given "second class"
citizenship to emotional distress and intangible economic loss as
harms or protected interests."7 Moreover, as the bevy of special
rules invoked by courts in the fear of diseases cases attests, they
have continued to do so even as they have expanded liability for
negligence causing emotional distress.
The ill fit between negligence doctrine and the equivalence the-
sis invites two obvious questions: How could courts have gone
down this road in the first place and why do they still insist, to
some degree, on staying that course? The now-standard answer to
the first question is that the nineteenth-century judges who first
4E.g., Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828 (Cal. 1989).
"
5 Prosser, supra note 91, § 34, at 211-12.
116 Often in discussions about tort liability for emotional distress, the equivalence
thesis is connected to a claim about neuroscience. It is only a matter of time, the claim
goes, until the line between psychic and physical injuries collapses completely in the
face of mounting knowledge about how the physical operations of the brain link up to
emotional states. At that point, the equivalence thesis will be established not merely
as a matter of theory or experience, but as hard science. See id. § 11, at 55-56.
," See supra note 19 (citing Professor Dobbs' discussion of courts' traditional reluc-
tance to recognize NIED claims).
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elaborated the modern law of negligence labored under various
pre-modem misconceptions about science and nature that led them
to discount emotional injury as insubstantial or unreal."' Moreover,
their illusions were tied to a generally sexist disposition. Emotional
distress was, to their eyes, the sort of thing that women, in all their
delicacy, experienced.9 As women's interests were, at the time, of
little concern to the law, emotional distress was not either.
Assuming its validity, this explanation still leaves the second
puzzle. On the whole, modem judges no longer operate under ei-
ther the strongly sexist conception that women's interests are of no
legal concern, or that women are emotionally delicate in a way that
men are not. Moreover, judges presumably no longer employ nine-
teenth-century, pseudo-scientific notions. Yet, as we have seen,
they still show a general reluctance to push negligence law where it
ought to be under the equivalence thesis. For negligent conduct (as
opposed to nonfeasance) that causes physical harm, the general
rule is that the defendant is on the hook for any foreseeable harms
proximately caused by his negligent conduct."° Indeed, as told by
influential scholars such as the late Professor Gary Schwartz, the
great "story" of negligence law in the twentieth century-as it ap-
plies to physical harms-was the casting off of the various archaic
and arbitrary limits on its reach, such as the privity rule, special
duty rules for landowners, charitable immunity, contributory negli-
gence, and so on.' With this, one witnessed the emergence of a
"pure" fault principle under which liability attaches, prima facie, to
any unreasonable conduct that in fact causes another a physical
harm.' Yet Professor Schwartz never supposed that courts had ar-
"'See Prosser, supra note 91, § 11, at 54-57 (noting and debunking various argu-
ments for denying the legally compensable character of emotional distress injuries).
"9 Id. § 11, at 55 ("It is not difficult to discover.., a distinctly masculine astonish-
ment that any woman should ever be so silly as to allow herself to be frightened or
shocked into a miscarriage.").
"z0 Dobbs, supra note 19, § 227, at 578.
121 Gary T. Schwartz, The Vitality of Negligence and the Ethics of Strict Liability, 15
Ga. L. Rev. 963, 963-68 (1981); see also Gary T. Schwartz, The Beginning and the
Possible End of The Rise of Modern American Tort Law, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 601, 605-09
(1992) (exploring why judges were motivated to expand negligence liability to its full
extent).
"See Goldberg & Zipursky, The Place of Duty, supra note 6, at 660, 664 (noting
that the Third Restatement, as drafted by Professor Schwartz, contains this formula-
tion of the prima facie case of negligence causing physical harms).
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rived at a comparable general principle of liability for NIED. In-
stead, we see only the partial and fragmented patchwork of re-
forms noted above. Moreover, in place of the older formalisms,
modern courts have introduced formalisms of their own. Indeed,
the standard-bearer of instrumentalism, the California Supreme
Court, is among the worst offenders here, as evidenced by its insis-
tence that only close relatives who contemporaneously observe the
injury may recover under the theory of bystander liability,1" and its
insistence on the likelier-than-not requirement in Potter.'24 The
most emphatic recognition of this divergence between the law of
negligent infliction of physical harm and NIED is found in the ba-
sic negligence provisions of Professor Schwartz's draft of the Third
Restatement, 1" which carve out emotional distress claims for sepa-
rate treatment from claims for physical harm on precisely this
ground.'26
What, on the standard view, explains these continued departures
from the equivalence thesis? The answer, its adherents suppose, is
to be found in the interaction between principle and practice. In
principle, the law of negligence ought to incorporate the equiva-
lence thesis: The law ought to contain a pure fault regime that at-
taches liability to any person's negligent conduct that in fact causes
any sort of harm to another. In practice, however, it simply cannot.
There is too much distress in the world traceable to the negligent
acts of others to suppose that it should be prima facie actionable.
Moreover, too much of this distress takes the form of transitory
upset, rather than lasting harm warranting compensation and de-
terrence. Finally, and probably most importantly, claims of emo-
tional distress are, as contrasted to claims of physical injury, harder
to substantiate, easier to fake, and harder to value. For all of these
reasons, the operation of a pure fault regime that incorporates the
equivalence thesis would in practice be too prone to error, abuse,
"3Thing v. LaChusa, 771 P.2d 814, 828-29 (Cal. 1989) (noting that denial of recov-
ery to close friends and partners is arbitrary, yet necessary to avoid floodgates and
fraud problems).
124 See supra text accompanying notes 108-112 (describing the holding in Potter).
" See Goldberg & Zipursky, The Place of Duty, supra note 6, at 664 (quoting the
relevant commentary from the Draft Restatement).
116 Martha Chamallas, Removing Emotional Harm from the Core of Tort Law, 54
Vand. L. Rev. 751,753 (2001).
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overdeterrence, and overcompensation. 27 And so the courts have
settled on various limitations on claims for negligent infliction of
emotional distress, including the predicate injury/parasitic damage
distinction, the requirement that fright plaintiffs prove a physical
illness, the limitation of bystander liability to close relatives who
observe the injury, and so on. The difference is that these limits,
unlike the old proximate cause limit, are employed not for reasons
of faulty metaphysics or sexism, but because of sound considera-
tions of policy.
Unfortunately, although these lines are now supposedly well-
grounded, the policies on which they rest tend not to contain
within them guidance as to how these lines might be drawn in a
principled manner. Perhaps some of the foregoing policy consid-
erations contain such guidance. To reduce trivial and fraudulent
claims, for example, it might make sense for courts to insist that
emotional distress plaintiffs provide evidence from a treating phy-
sician or other competent expert as to the existence of his or her
distress and its severity. (That is, assuming there is not a cadre of
experts prepared to testify to distress at the drop of a hat.) Other
objectives-particularly the concern about too much liability-
offer no principled basis for deciding where to cut off NIED liabil-
ity. The concern over too much litigation and liability is aggregate
in nature. As such, it contains no distributive principle. Thus, it is
not surprising that what we see by the end of the twentieth century
is not a realization of the fault principle in the area of emotional
distress, but the realization that the courts are obligated out of
practical considerations to restrict its operation, even though the
courts cannot justify all or even most of the lines that they are
drawing. Instead, all they can do is acknowledge the need for some
line to be drawn while being candid, as was the California Supreme
Court in Thing v. LaChusa, that any such line will, in essence, be
picked out of a hat.1"
" Prosser, supra note 91, § 34, at 212 (" [T]he only valid objection against recov-
ery ... is the danger of vexatious suits and fictitious claims, which has loomed very
large in the opinions as an obstacle.").
1 771 P.2d at 828 (acknowledging the necessity of drawing arbitrary lines limiting
liability). The Supreme Court's decision to review the Ayers case, 122 S.Ct. 1434
(2002) (mem.)-an unreported opinion that offered a fairly straightforward interpre-
tation of FELA over which there is no circuit split-was perhaps driven by a sense
that some device-whether a particularly narrow definition of "predicate injury," or a
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C. Against NIED
The standard account of the law pertaining to negligent causa-
tion of emotional distress is essentially an admission of failure, or
at least an expression of substantial humility. The law in this area
can do no better than announce restrictions on liability whose only
justification is: "We can't do any better than this." Such a state of
affairs at least warrants an attempt at reconceptualization. Has
something gone unrealized that, once realized, might point to a
more satisfactory analysis of these issues? We think so.
The problem with the standard view stems from its reliance on
the equivalence thesis. This is not to say that the equivalence thesis
is false. Rather, the equivalence thesis is not the appropriate
benchmark for assessing the coherence of negligence jurisprudence
(and tort law more generally). The equivalence thesis becomes the
benchmark only if negligence law is conceived in a particular way,
namely as a device for deterring and compensating victims of
harmful conduct. It is that deeper premise, when conjoined with
the thesis treating all species of harm as equivalent, which gives
rise to the view that, prima facie, negligence law ought not to draw
doctrinal distinctions between physical and emotional harms.
Likewise, it is that deeper premise, which, by suggesting that negli-
gence liability for emotional distress ought in principle to be wide
open, requires courts and commentators to scramble to implement
ad hoc practical constraints on such claims.
If one takes a different perspective on negligence, however, then
one can grant the truth of the equivalence thesis, but still insist, as
negligence law traditionally has, on distinguishing among species of
harm. Part I of this Article suggests that an adequate explanation
of the injury requirement necessitates a shift in the focus of analy-
sis from the defendant to the plaintiff. The injury requirement is
not well framed in terms of the question: "Did the defendant do
something such that he is deserving of sanction or such that it
would enhance social welfare to sanction him?" Rather, the right
question to ask is: "Has the plaintiff been wronged such that she is
heightened proof requirement as to plaintiff having experienced fear-is necessary to
ward off a flood of fear-of-injury claims in the asbestos context. It remains to be seen
whether the Justices will decide to impose such a filter, and whether they can justify it
on anything other than ad hoc policy grounds.
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now entitled to seek recourse?" Now the standard analysis has
again focused on the wrong party, although this time the problem
manifests itself as an exclusive focus on the plaintiff, not the defen-
dant. To be sure, a plaintiff must establish an injury to have stand-
ing to sue in negligence. But injury, of course, is not of itself suffi-
cient to sustain a negligence cause of action. The plaintiff must
further demonstrate that she suffered that injury because the de-
fendant breached a duty to take care not to cause the type of injury
of which the plaintiff complains. As a law of civil recourse, negli-
gence law empowers a plaintiff to complain in a court that she has
been injured as a result of the defendant failing to heed a duty to
be vigilant of her well-being. The critical question then becomes:
"Of what sort of harm was the defendant under a duty to be vigi-
lant?" With this shift in perspective, it becomes quite intelligible to
differentiate among species of harms. To deny that emotional dis-
tress is generally actionable does not require us to deny that it is a
harm, nor to denigrate it as a less serious or important form of
harm than physical injury. It is instead to assert that actors are not
ordinarily under a legal duty to be vigilant of others' emotional
well-being.
We have seen, as a matter of black-letter law, that this latter
proposition about duty seems quite well-established. Whereas de-
cisions such as Heaven v. Pender29 and MacPherson v. Buick Motor
Co." long ago announced a general duty to take care not to cause
physical harm and illness, no comparable decisions have taken hold
with respect to emotional distress. 3' This is just another way of say-
ing that there is no such thing as a general principle that negli-
gently inflicted emotional distress is an actionable tort. Instead,
there is a patchwork of limited-duty rules.
As with the black-letter requirement of injury, the reader will no
doubt want some explanation for the absence of a general duty to
avoid causing emotional distress. Why would the law acknowledge
a general duty to be vigilant of others' physical well-being but not
an equivalent duty to be vigilant of others' emotional well-being?
We have briefly canvassed some of the reasons that support this
"9 11 Q.B.D. 503 (Eng. C.A. 1883).
"o 111 N.E. 1050 (N.Y. 1916).
131 Professor Dobbs notes that two state supreme courts, Montana and Tennessee,
have haltingly flirted with the proposition. See Dobbs, supra note 19, § 312, at 850-51.
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distinction elsewhere,32 as Professor Geistfeld has done, from a
somewhat different perspective, in his contribution to this Sympo-
sium." These include the idea that negligence law must set duties
in a manner that permits actors to set priorities about the sorts of
injuries they must take care to avoid, which are not overly demand-
ing. We elaborate and expand on these explanations below.
Before doing so, however, one more bit of brush clearing is in
order. This concerns the traditional distinction between predicate
injury and parasitic damages. As we have noted, the distinction is a
very real one in the law."M Lost profits are typically recovered as
parasitic damages in a personal injury action, but negligent causing
of pure economic harm is generally not actionable. An unforesee-
able extent of damages is actionable as parasitic damages conse-
quent upon a foreseeable physical injury, but where the predicate
injury is itself unforeseeable, there might be no action at all.
One of the most familiar of these distinctions is drawn in the
area of emotional harm. Pain and suffering, trauma, and fear are
generally proper subjects of damages in a personal injury action
based on physical injury. On the other hand, as we have seen, neg-
ligently causing pure emotional injury, outside of a few pockets, is
generally nonactionable" Strikingly, courts sometimes apply a
version of this type of rule in the fear of disease scenario. An indi-
vidual who has been diagnosed with benign mesothelioma and con-
sequently has a fear of cancer may recover for the actual physical
injury of mesothelioma and the emotional injury of fear of cancer.
On the other hand, a person with the same exposure and no meso-
thelioma often will be unable to recover for the fear of cancer."
All of this is quite unintelligible on the standard account. If there
is liability for fear of cancer, it should be because fear of cancer is
foreseeable and is the sort of injury for which recovery is provided.
But, if- this is true, then there should be liability for fear of cancer
regardless of whether it accompanies a physical injury for which
... Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 1833 (discussing prioritization of obliga-
tions).
3 Geistfeld, supra note 69, at 1929-34 (discussing prioritization from an economic
perspective).
See supra text accompanying notes 87-92.
"3 See supra text accompanying notes 87-103 (describing the actual exposure rule).
136 See supra text accompanying notes 87 & 104.
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there is liability. The only explanation for the predicate/parasitic
distinction must, again, be that it functions as a crude limit on ex-
cessive or fraudulent litigation.
It is a mistake to suppose that, where there is the same act and
the same consequence, there must be the same possibility of recov-
ery. The problem is that there are many ways of defining an act.
One way to define an act is in part by reference to its conse-
quences. Whether there has been an actionable breach of duty in
negligence law depends upon whether the defendant has in fact
performed an action that injured the plaintiff. Not every such ac-
tion-not even every carelessly performed act of injuring the plain-
tiff-is actionable. Rather, the injury caused by the defendant must
be an injury that the defendant has a duty to be careful not to
cause.'37 The general rule in tort law is that one has a duty to take
care not to cause physical injury to others, and that one does not
have a duty to take care to prevent emotional injuries or pure eco-
nomic injuries to others. If the wrong species of injury is realized,
then there is a mismatch between the duty pleaded and the injury
proved: The injury complained of is not one that the defendant was
under a duty to take care not to cause.
But if this is so, why do courts permit damages for emotional
harm even as parasitic damages? The answer is the traditional one:
The measure of damages is an entirely different question from
what sorts of duties one must observe to avoid injuring others.
Rather, the measure of damages is typically made by ascertaining
what would fairly compensate a plaintiff who has made out a
breach of duty causing the right kind of injury. This is a question
about remedies, not about whether there is an actionable tort.
Conversely, where there is no predicate tort of negligently causing
physical injury, there should be no liability for mental injury.
An implication of this critique is that the ancient phrase dam-
num absque injuria (harm, but not cognizable harm) may help il-
luminate the area of emotional harm. For it is plain that, where
' Traditional formulations of the negligence tort capture this limitation by defining
it, in part, as the "breach of a duty of reasonable care owed to persons such as the
plaintiff." This is opposed to the looser, modem formulation, "failure to act as a rea-
sonable person." See Goldberg & Zipursky, The Place of Duty, supra note 6, at 684-
87 (noting that abandonment of "duty" and "breach" causes misdescriptions of the
negligence tort).
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there has been emotional distress due to fear of a disease or fear of
injury, there has been some form of harm to the plaintiff. That is
why something more than compensation for physical damages is
properly required to make the plaintiff whole. But it does not fol-
low from the existence of emotional distress caused by wrongful
conduct that there has been a wrong. In our system, it is required
that the emotional harm rise to the level of an emotional "injury" if
the negligence causing it is to count as a wrong. The concept of an
"injury," used in this way, is normative in a way that "harm" or
"damages" is not. It requires that the loss that the plaintiff has suf-
fered is a loss that she has some kind of entitlement to be free
from, a part of her in which she is entitled to be secure. Correla-
tively, the defendant must have been under a duty to take reason-
able care not to cause this type of injury.
D. Rethinking NIED: Agency and Responsibility
Courts have struggled in their attempts to analyze fear-of-injury
cases within the NIED framework. This is not surprising, we have
suggested, because the NIED framework is itself built on a set of
misconceptions. The law of negligence does not in fact recognize a
general obligation to be vigilant of others' emotional well-being
that needs to be cabined-in by various ad hoc restrictions. None of
this is meant to suggest, however, that the courts have been mis-
taken in permitting certain plaintiffs who fear future injury from
recovering from defendants who have negligently created that fear.
Rather, it suggests that we need a better way of accounting for
these claims, and for determining when departures from the back-
ground rule are acceptable.
In the following Sections, we develop an alternative analytic
framework for cases of negligence causing fear of future illness.
Because the argument is somewhat intricate, it is worthwhile to
provide a brief road map. The previous Section criticized the stan-
dard view that the default rule against recovery for emotional
harm, as well as its exceptions, are explicable in terms of various
concerns that fall under the general heading of administrability.
Section III.D.1 criticizes the most common and influential of these
arguments: the fraud argument. That argument maintains that the
default rule is prompted by a concern that the subjectivity of emo-
tional harm-the fact that it is an internal mental state not directly
1676 [Vol. 88:1625
Unrealized Torts
observable to others-renders negligence law prone to abuse by
plaintiffs who will feign psychic injuries to obtain compensation.
The fraud argument is unconvincing as stated. Its focus on the sub-
jectivity of emotional distress, however, points to a different and
more plausible concern that does help explain negligence law's
suspicion of emotional harm claims: Emotional harm is often,
though not always, in the control of, and therefore the responsibil-
ity of, the victim. We call this the "agency concern." When prop-
erly fleshed out, the agency concern not only yields an understand-
ing of why negligence law is reluctant to acknowledge emotional
harm claims, it also explains why courts have drawn exceptions to
the default rule of no liability in certain clusters of cases.'38
Section llI.D.3 brings together Part II's discussion of heightened
risk with the discussion of emotional harm in order to reveal the
nature of the dilemma that courts have faced in the future injury
cases. Recognition of heightened risk of future illness as an injury
in itself is problematic because it seems to render cognizable a
claim based on something which, if it is a harm at all, seems to be a
premature or unripened version of the "real" harm at issue (the
harm of a serious illness). Yet, recognition for claims of emotional
harm associated with heightened risk of illness seems to invite
claims for a type of harm that is, in a normative sense, the victim's
doing or the victim's problem. The Section then advances a phi-
losophical framework that permits us to navigate the horns of this
dilemma and thereby explain why some claims for negligence caus-
ing emotional distress resulting from exposure to a heightened risk
of disease ought to be cognizable. Specifically, it harnesses the con-
cept of "secondary legal qualities" to explain how certain interfer-
ences with one's life can be objective in the specific sense that they
have the characteristic of being the sort of interference that tends
to cause reasonable persons who are exposed to them to suffer
emotional distress. Section III.E pulls these various argumentative
strands together by arguing that a defendant who carelessly gener-
ates a set of circumstances that interfere with the plaintiff's interest
in being free from the pall associated with being at substantial risk
of a serious illness may be held responsible for the emotional dis-
tress experienced by the plaintiff because of those circumstances.
,s See discussion infra Section III.D.2.
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The pall of being under a threat of serious illness is an objective
state of affairs that can be identified by judges. It also attests that
the victim's emotional distress is not fairly described as being her
problem or of her own making. In short, we argue that "future in-
jury" claims can be cast as claims for negligently causing the victim
to endure a significant threat of suffering a serious illness.
1. Fraud and Subjectivity
In 1941, Dean Prosser maintained that "the only valid objection
against recovery for mental injury is the danger of vexatious suits
and fictitious claims."'39 This assessment, still widely shared, rests
on the idea that emotional harm is fundamentally subjective in a
way that bodily injury is not. So put, the fraud concern is remarka-
bly unpersuasive, as we demonstrate below. Why, then, have so
many legal scholars been attracted to it as an account of the limited
nature of obligations to avoid causing emotional distress? The
fraud (or feigning) argument has persisted because it captures,
clumsily, a different and deeper concern with liability for emo-
tional harm. We label this deeper concern the "agency concern,"
and develop it in the remainder of this Section. Understanding the
agency concern is essential to realizing what is going on in cases
raising issues of NIED.
The fraud objection to general recovery for negligent infliction
of emotional distress is unpersuasive for several reasons. First and
foremost, most of the reported cases involve factual scenarios
where there is every reason to believe that the plaintiff did or
would have suffered some emotional harm."4 Thus, for example, a
woman frightened by horses galloping right up to her face probably
would suffer at least some negative effect, for example, fear. Any
person who is at heightened risk of cancer probably will suffer
some distress from knowing this fact; likewise for persons facing a
substantially heightened risk of HIV infection. In cases where a
child, spouse, friend, or even a stranger is injured or killed in (or
sometimes out of) the presence of the plaintiff, there is little doubt
that some emotional harm exists. In these scenarios, there are, of
course, issues whose veracity merits scrutiny. One issue concerns
139 Prosser, supra note 91, § 34, at 212.
'40 Dobbs, supra note 19, § 302, at 822-23.
1678 [Vol. 88:1625
Unrealized Torts
whether events in fact unfolded in the manner alleged by the plain-
tiff. This issue, of course, is not unique to claims for emotional dis-
tress. Another issue is whether the extent or degree of emotional
harm alleged by the plaintiff actually exists. This latter question,
however, is also present in cases allowing recovery for emotional
harm as parasitic damages, and the common law has a general rule
permitting such awards.
The asserted risk of fraud supposedly emerges from the fact that
emotional harm is subjective-that is, in the plaintiff's mind. But it
is far too late in the day, either in torts or in the law more broadly,
to eliminate a legal concept or remedy because it raises an issue of
subjective mental states. Every case alleging an intentional tort,
seeking punitive damages, or pursuing a claim of defamation on
behalf of a public figure requires the fact finder to make some de-
termination as to a party's state of mind, yet that does not present
an obstacle in these areas. Moreover, as to particular emotional
harms for particular individuals, it is today possible to utilize spe-
cialists in psychiatry and psychology who are generally capable of
ascertaining, at least to some degree, the extent of emotional dam-
age.
Finally, if the fraud objection were serious, one would expect
changes in the law to reflect this. They do not. Consider, for exam-
ple, the weakening of the physical injury rule into a physical impact
rule. It is probably as easy to claim a slight physical impact-a
touching-as an emotional harm. And it is far easier to fabricate an
impact than an actual injury. Consider also that many jurisdictions
that permit recovery for emotional harm do so only when it is se-
vere. If plaintiffs can feign psychic injury to a degree that renders
such claims unadjudicable, is there any reason to suppose that they
are incapable of disingenuously converting a minor psychic injury
into a severe one?
We do not raise these challenges to the fraud objection out of a
desire to open the way to a wide array of emotional distress claims.
Rather, we suggest that if the fraud objection is as weak as it ap-
pears to be, yet continues to grip courts and commentators, it must
be because there is some other idea at work, related to the fraud
objection, that actually does carry some weight.
For the purpose of elucidating this idea, it will be helpful to draw
an analogy from a seemingly distant realm outside the adjudication
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of legal disputes. Suppose a child returns from school complaining
of hurt feelings or emotional injury because of schoolyard taunts.
Her parent(s) might respond in a number of ways. One possibility
is to focus on the child's feelings, to explore their dimensions, and
to offer solace and intangible or even tangible acts designed to fos-
ter emotional healing (for example, a hug or a trip to Ben &
Jerry's).
Often, however, there is a balance to be struck, for it might well
be a mistake to foster an undue preoccupation in the child with her
hurt feelings. The problem is that children sometimes overreact to
negative experiences like the one described. Sometimes they make
a mountain out of a molehill. In certain contexts, therefore, it may
be appropriate for parents to downplay the hurt feelings, to change
the subject, to foster an attitude of shrugging it off. The parent who
utters it, more realistically, conveys in other than words, cliches
like "Sticks and stones may break my bones, but names will never
hurt me" or "Don't make a mountain out of a molehill" is taking
this tack.
To tell a child that she is making a mountain out of a molehill
might sound like an accusation of misrepresentation, and some-
times it might be used to convey that message. But its literal mean-
ing assumes that in fact there is something to complain about (the
molehill). Thus, when the expression is invoked, it typically does
not carry the suggestion that the child is making things up. Rather,
it is meant to inculcate or reinforce a norm of how to respond,
emotionally, to an adverse event by being resilient or thick-
skinned. A parent who takes this approach aims to provide a sort
of emotional education or nurture a kind of spirit, not to accuse his
child of fraud. A culture, institution, or school that does not toler-
ate children crying beyond a certain age is not involved in disbelief
of an emotional response; it is simply involved in setting norms.
The directive "Don't make a mountain out of a molehill" not
only aims to guide the child toward a response of minimization. It
also asserts, at a deeper level, that the emotional response is some-
thing that is, to some degree, in the child's own control. In an un-
usually literal way, it presupposes that the child is in part responsi-
ble for his emotional response.
Now let us return from the home and the schoolyard to the
courtroom. We believe that the much-vaunted fraud objection is in
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fact a loose way of expressing the concerns that particular plaintiffs
in emotional distress cases are making mountains out of molehills,
and that permitting a cause of action for pure emotional harm will
invite or encourage citizens to make mountains out of molehills." '
As the foregoing analogy suggests, it is a mistake to interpret the
core of this idea as an accusation of, or concern about, fakery or
feigning. Rather, it refers, albeit obliquely, to two other things we
have mentioned. First, it provides a legal version of norm-setting
and norm-articulation, where the norm is one of fostering the
thick-skinned response of getting on with life, rather than dwelling
on one's upset. Second, it is a recognition that, to some degree, the
plaintiff herself bears responsibility for the depth of emotional
harm she feels. This is not to say that, as a matter of fact, all per-
sons have a choice in each instance as to how great an emotional
effect some event or accident will have. Rather, it is a normative
ideal of holding plaintiffs responsible for their personal responses.
In a nutshell, then, the idea is that a plaintiff's emotional re-
sponse to a state of affairs is a matter for which she herself can
sometimes, indeed often, be held responsible. Emotional distress is
not simply an uncontrolled or uncontrollable reflex, as is the bodily
response to a blow or a toxin. It is a response mediated by the mind
of the plaintiff. Despite its obvious vices, the old rule of proximate
cause actually captured this idea. It went astray because it simply
assumed that the existence of this mediation was always sufficient
to cut off responsibility on the part of the defendant.'42 In this as-
sumption, it took on the cast of a harsh "blame the victim" mind-
set, characteristic of an era captivated by rugged individualism. We
will suggest, however, that a more subtle version of the responsibil-
ity idea does not translate into a blame the victim rule for emo-
tional distress claims. Rather, it will help us to identify those in-
stances in which plaintiffs seeking recovery for emotional distress
ought to recover.
Recognition of the notion that a plaintiff's agency plays an im-
portant role in the generation of emotional distress has several im-
plications for the doctrinal structure of negligence law. First, it is
41 Thanks to Professor Margo Schlanger for encouraging this line of inquiry in the
course of discussions at the conference.
142 See supra text accompanying notes 90-91 (describing the old proximate cause
doctrine).
2002] 1681
1682 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 88:1625
not clear that severe emotional harm is always something for which
the defendant whose conduct precipitates the harm is responsible.
If, in fact, the escalation into emotional distress is something the
plaintiff is entirely responsible for, then the defendant is off the
hook. Second, and more saliently for the vast run of cases, it sug-
gests a need to identify conditions or circumstances that will help
determine when a plaintiff can be said to be not responsible for his
experience of distress. These points, taken together, may further
suggest that fear-of-future-injury claimants are not, after all, pursu-
ing claims for "pure" emotional distress. Rather, they are com-
plaining about the presence, in plaintiff's life, of a state of affairs
that precipitates emotional harm, and does so in a manner that
does not so involve the plaintiff's responsibility that it calls into
doubt the cogency of assigning responsibility to defendant.
If these observations are correct, then the absence of a general
duty to avoid causing emotional distress links up to certain other
features of negligence law, including comparative fault, assumption
of risk, and the duty to mitigate damages. Each of these features
denies or reduces plaintiff's recovery on the ground that plaintiff is
wholly or partially responsible for his injury. Comparative respon-
sibility and failure to mitigate generally involve a notion of plaintiff
fault. Assumption of risk asserts that the plaintiff is responsible for
certain injuries regardless of fault, because she knowingly and
freely chose to take on certain risks of others behaving carelessly.
Just to be clear-we do not mean to suggest that emotional overre-
action is the fault of the plaintiff, or that plaintiffs typically "as-
sume the risk" of being distressed. We do not believe that the idea
of responsibility for distress is, or should be incorporated into, the
doctrines of comparative fault or assumption of risk. At this point,
we are merely noting that the agency concern bears a family re-
semblance to those other ideas.
The connection between the agency concern and the default rule
against recognizing a duty to take care not to cause emotional
harm can be illuminated by considering the traditional rule barring
licensees from suing landowners in negligence for physical injuries
caused by unsafe conditions other than known traps. Both emo-
tional distress claims and licensee claims are frequently categorized
as "limited duty" cases. Both depend upon the idea that the defen-
dant in these classes of cases should not be held responsible for this
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aspect of the plaintiff's well-being. This is not-as in duty-to-rescue
cases-because of the absence of misfeasance on the part of the de-
fendant. Nor is it because the assignment of liability in these in-
stances either would leave defendants shouldering responsibilities
much more demanding than those customarily recognized of per-
sons in similar situations or would expose them to conflicting obli-
gations. Instead, the courts' circumscription of these duties is itself
an allocation of responsibility for certain aspects of plaintiffs' well-
being to the plaintiffs themselves. Although this analysis in some
ways invokes ideas similar to that of assumption of risk, there is no
suggestion that these plaintiffs knew of, or voluntarily subjected
themselves to, the risk of the defendant acting carelessly toward
them. Instead, when the courts in these areas deny a cause of ac-
tion, it is based on their conclusion that the obligation to take care
to avoid injury to the plaintiff ought to be assigned to the plaintiff.
Because this allocation concerns responsibility in a sense that per-
tains to the scope of obligation, it is rightly expressed in terms of
"no duty" or "limited duty" rather than assumption of risk. Thus,
the traditional rule for licensees reflects a judgment, right or
wrong, that it shall be the licensee's obligation to see to it that she
is not injured by unknown, unsafe conditions when she is a social
guest on another's land. Similarly, the default rule against recovery
for emotional harm reflects a judgment that the maintenance of
one's emotional well-being in the face of adversity is something for
which a plaintiff ordinarily must take responsibility.
The idea of responsibility for one's own emotional responses
also links to two other aspects of negligence law. One of them is
the irrelevance of diligence and good faith to the inquiry into the
defendant's breach and the plaintiffs comparative fault. As Justice
Holmes famously demonstrated, the common law of negligence
holds each of us to a standard of conduct outside of our own par-
ticular strengths and weaknesses.143 Similarly, the general rule
against recovery for pure emotional harm borrows from this objec-
tive standard. In denying some emotional distress claims, the law
does not suppose that plaintiffs are fabricating their distress.
Rather, it holds them to an external standard that, to some extent,
ignores their particular vulnerabilities.
' Holmes, supra note 2, at 108.
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, negligence law's evident
wariness of assigning liability for pure emotional harm connects
with the very idea of civil recourse. As Professor Weinrib has untir-
ingly argued, tort law conceives of the plaintiff and defendant as
having been enmeshed in a certain kind of episode in which the de-
fendant is the "doer" and the plaintiff the "sufferer."' " In this epi-
sode, the defendant is the agent of harm and the plaintiff the victim
of harm. The defendant is an actor who acts upon the plaintiff and
inflicts an injury upon her.'45 This conception of tort as a paradigm
involving the defendant actively wronging the plaintiff is stylized in
certain ways and we have criticized it elsewhere.' But it captures
the core truth that our system does not treat plaintiff and defen-
dant as reciprocal causes-this idea is precisely where the radical-
ism of Professor Coase and Judge Calabresi lies. 47 Instead, tort
conceives of the plaintiff with a meritorious claim as a victim rather
than an agent. The notion of the plaintiff as one who is acted upon
plays a central role in the system of civil recourse, for it is being
acted upon that triggers the right to redress one's injuries. As a
wide array of reputational, dignitary, and pecuniary "injuries" in
tort indicate, there is nothing essentially physical or bodily about
this conception of being acted upon, of being the victim of a wrong.
Nevertheless, what is crucial-at least historically under the com-
mon law-is that the injury be inflicted from without, rather than
self-inflicted. The plaintiff's injury cannot be her responsibility, for
she is using the legal system to obtain recourse for something done
144Weinrib, supra note 56, at 81.
4
' Id. at 63-66. Weinrib ties the conception of what happens when a tort occurs to
an ideal of "corrective justice," in which tort law is viewed as reversing or undoing the
wrong visited on the victim by requiring the injurer to return what he has taken from
the plaintiff. Id. at 64-65. We have here and elsewhere rejected this characterization
of how tort law responds, suggesting that it does not so much force the defendant to
give something back to plaintiff, as it permits plaintiff to seek recourse (through the
law) against the defendant. Nonetheless, Professor Weinrib's characterization of indi-
vidual torts as essentially involving an injurer visiting a wrong upon a victim is quite
sound.
'4 See, e.g., Zipursky, supra note 49 (distinguishing civil recourse from Weinribian
corrective justice theory).
4' This, of course, is a point that Professor Epstein long ago conveyed in a some-
what different context. See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Le-
gal Stud. 151, 160-61 (1973) (criticizing Coase's conception of causation as applied to
tort law).
1684 [Vol. 88:1625
Unrealized Torts
to her by someone else. Characterizing the plaintiff's emotional re-
sponse as her responsibility undercuts the idea that defendant in-
flicted it.
2. Revisiting Exceptions to the Default Rule of No Duty
The reader should again bear in mind that the account here is
not intended to justify a blanket rule against recovery for pure
emotional harm. Rather, it is intended to explain the reluctance of
the courts to recognize a broad duty to take care to avoid causing
emotional distress. The nub of the explanation is that we do not
treat the plaintiff's emotional harm as an injury that exists inde-
pendent of the plaintiff's own response or independent of the legal
system's choice to treat it as such. Instead, the rule is itself a norm
that holds persons responsible and refuses to deem emotional in-
jury as a fact impervious to the plaintiff's own will.
The notion of bearing (at least partial) responsibility for one's
own emotional state helps illuminate several aspects of negligence
law. First, it helps make sense of both the predicate physical injury
rule and why the judicial attempt to water-down the predicate-
injury rule into an impact rule is fundamentally wrongheaded. The
predicate-injury rule reflects a generalization that, when one suf-
fers distress in connection with a traumatic physical harm or illness,
one does not make a mountain out of a molehill. Taken in refer-
ence to substantial physical wounds and illnesses, the rule has some
plausibility. That plausibility diminishes, however, when the rule
tends toward overinclusiveness, which is exactly the consequence
when one substitutes impact for injury. The "least touching" for-
mulation, long applied to intentional wrongdoings such as many
batteries, has no place in negligence precisely because it fails to
take seriously the fact that a victim's emotional distress over slight
touchings is, absent other circumstances, her own responsibility.
The notion of responsibility for emotional states also explains
other contours of tort. The tort of assault is thought to provide the
oldest example of a recognized claim for "emotional distress.""
Assault is actionable when the injurer causes an apprehension of
imminent harmful or offensive touching in the victim. When a bul-
let or fist whizzes past someone's head and he or she feels fright,
" Prosser, supra note 91, § 10, at 48 (noting old actions for assault).
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that is an emotional response, but it is quite different from the ex-
ample of the schoolyard taunt. The response is visceral, immediate,
and unthinking. In this context, it makes little sense to hold the
plaintiff responsible for the response and makes much more sense
to think of the plaintiff as a victim who exercised little or no
agency. Relatedly, the idea of responsibility yields insight into the
notorious "zone of danger" rule. A person who is in a car and ex-
periences a car crash, or is otherwise part of an episode of grievous
peril, will often respond to that episode viscerally."9 Indeed, it is
quite unreasonable to expect anything other than a visceral re-
sponse to an episode of extreme imperilment and serious injury to
another. This is not to say that the zone of danger rule is the ap-
propriate standard for claims of negligence causing emotional dis-
tress, but only that its role as a longstanding and conspicuous ex-
ception to the general no-duty rule is interestingly explained by the
foregoing account.
Third, many contemporary cases contemplate relaxing the bar
on recovery for pure emotional harm only where the harm is "se-
vere.""15 Indeed, there is now a principle or catchphrase that is
commonly trotted out to capture this notion of severity. Consider
the following comment on "severe emotional distress" from the
Restatement (Second) of Torts:
Emotional distress passes under various names, such as mental
suffering, mental anguish, mental or nervous shock, or the like. It
includes all highly unpleasant mental reactions, such as fright,
horror, grief, shame, humiliation, embarrassment, anger, chagrin,
disappointment, worry, and nausea. It is only where it is extreme
that the liability arises. Complete emotional tranquility is seldom
attainable in this world, and some degree of transient and trivial
emotional distress is a part of the price of living among people.
The law intervenes only where the distress inflicted is so severe
that no reasonable man could be expected to endure it.5'
See, e.g., Robb v. Pa. R.R. Co., 210 A.2d 709, 709-10 (Del. 1965) (allowing recov-
ery for NIED when the plaintiff narrowly avoided being run over by a train).
"0 See, e.g., Kosmacek v. Farm Serv. Co-op of Persia, 485 N.W.2d 99, 104 (Iowa Ct.
App. 1992).
A Restatement (Second) of Torts § 46 cmt. j (1965) (emphasis added).
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While this comment pertains to intentional infliction of emotional
distress, its language has found its way into some negligence cases
in the fear of disease area.152
There is something very peculiar, on first blush, about the lan-
guage of this comment, for it is not clear what it means to be un-
able to "endure" emotional distress. Does this language mean that
only a person who has "fallen apart" may recover? If not, what
does it mean? This puzzle only arises because of a slip in the
courts' usage of the "no one could be expected to endure" lan-
guage. It is not the emotional harm itself that plaintiffs cannot be
expected to endure. After all, plaintiffs recover even if they do en-
dure tremendous fear, grief, upset or anguish, at least if "endure"
means survival at a functioning level. The problem is in the compo-
sition of the language of the comment. It is not the emotional dis-
tress that must be "beyond what a reasonable person could be ex-
pected to endure," it is the stress that must be beyond what that
person could endure. If this stress exceeds a certain threshold, then
a reasonable person cannot be expected to endure it. There are
situations in which a reasonable person cannot be expected to keep
a stiff upper lip; she cannot be expected to avoid responding by
tumbling into severe emotional distress, that is, situations in which
the mountain is a mountain, not a molehill.
We can illustrate this last point by taking a particularly gripping
example, one which provided the facts that led the New Jersey Su-
preme Court to modify the zone of danger rule in Portee v. Jaffee.'
The plaintiff was a mother who stood outside an elevator shaft for
four hours as her five-year-old son moved up and down the shaft,
caught between the elevator doors and the shaft, screaming."s
Hours after the elevator was finally stopped, the child died.' The
mother was severely traumatized by this event and sought recovery
for emotional harm.'56 The defendant building owner argued that,
since the mother was not in the zone of danger, she should not be
"2 E.g., Doe v. Northwestern Univ., 682 N.E.2d 145, 150 (Il. App. Ct. 1997), aff'd on
other grounds, Majca v. Beekil, 701 N.E.2d 1084 (Ill. 1998); Kosmacek, 485 N.W.2d at
104.
'-' 417 A.2d 521 (N.J. 1980).
"4 Id. at 522.
"5 Id. at 523.
-% Id.
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able to recover.'57 The New Jersey Supreme Court rejected the ar-
gument and adopted a rule permitting bystander recovery.'
Portee presents a compelling situation in which no parent could
reasonably be expected to endure without suffering severe emo-
tional distress. This is not to say that her level of subjective distress
was more than one could be expected to endure. It is rather that
the experience of helplessly witnessing for several hours the acci-
dental maiming and killing of one's child is "more than a reason-
able person could be expected to endure." There is no place, in a
case like this, for a court to send the message, "get over it" or
"keep a stiff upper lip." This is not because the emotional harm is
particularly severe as compared to others' emotional distress, but
instead because of the severity of the circumstances giving rise to
it.
The explanation for why certain cases present actionable wrongs
is symmetrical with the explanation of the general no-cause-of-
action rule. In the normal case, the norm is to treat the emotional
harm as, in part, the responsibility of the plaintiff; it does not per-
mit her to treat the injury as a fact entirely beyond her control; so-
ciety literally expects her (in a sense more normative than predic-
tive) to endure her circumstances rather than to plummet into
great emotional distress. It is quite natural then that in a case
where a reasonable person could not be expected to endure the
circumstances, the emotional harm is an injury for which the plain-
tiff may be treated as a victim rather than as an agent.
3. Evading the Dilemma of Fear-of-Future-Disease Claims:
Secondary Legal Qualities
In cases similar to Portee, the analytic route around the agency
concern is to point to features of the situation that so overbear the
plaintiff's resilience that one cannot regard the plaintiff's being
emotionally shattered as his responsibility. However, we have not
highlighted these cases in aid of establishing a new threshold of
"unendurability" over which all plaintiffs must pass in order to re-
cover in negligence for emotional distress. Rather, we have high-
lighted the issue of "endurability" to help capture a central concern
157 Id.
"S Id. at 528.
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that lurks behind the courts' disinclination to recognize negligent
infliction of emotional distress claims, as well their willingness to
abandon that disinclination in certain circumstances.
In fact, as we noted at the outset of this Part, negligence law not
only suppresses its general hostility to emotional distress claims in
those situations in which it is not fair to ask of the plaintiff that she
exercise agency with regard to her emotional response (as in
Portee), it also permits claims when the plaintiff's emotional re-
sponse is not really the primary harm about which she is complain-
ing. A classic example of this is a cause of action for libel, where
the libeled party has not suffered any economic loss. Typically, one
who has been falsely branded a child molester, for example, will
suffer emotional harm without physical harm, and the emotional
harm is part of why she is suing. Yet there is still a predicate harm
in this case-the intangible predicate harm of reputational dam-
age-that provides the foundation for the cause of action.
These reflections on the role of intangible predicate harms re-
turn us to the earlier analysis, in Part I, of claims for heightened
risk of injury. In particular, it is tempting to argue that plaintiffs
who are placed at heightened risk of physical injury have suffered a
kind of intangible predicate harm, like harm to reputation, that
could support a claim sounding in negligence for emotional dis-
tress. The problem with this argument is that, as stated, it amounts
to bootstrapping. A claim for "pure" emotional distress is problem-
atic because of the agency concern. A claim for heightened risk-
even if that risk is intelligible as a harm-does not invoke the sort
of harm that defendants have a duty to take care to avoid causing.
How can one make the case for recognizing a cause of action for
fear of future injury by combining these two different kinds of
problematic claims? To pose a more constructive version of the
same question: Is there a way that these two conditions-
circumstances posing a heightened risk of physical injury to the
plaintiff and the existence in the plaintiff of a subjective emotional
response-might combine to generate a basis for a claim in negli-
gence for fear of future disease? We will argue that there is a way.
In order to flesh out this idea, however, we must pause to sketch a
concept developed in another context.
In an earlier article on self-defense, one of us argued that certain
legal categorizations are best understood as identifying qualities
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that are akin in their structure to what John Locke called "secon-
dary qualities."1"9 These are qualities whose possession consists in
their being such as to be responded to by people in certain ways.
The classic example, for Locke, was the secondary quality of a
color-for example, the color blue."6 The color blue is an attribute
whose existence consists of looking blue to a normal person in or-
dinary lighting. Of course, blue things also have certain underlying
attributes that make them look blue in ordinary lighting, to the
normal perceiver. But their blueness, even if scientifically under-
standable at some different level, consists in their being such as to
look blue.
The self-defense article suggested that certain qualities of actions
or states of affairs are secondary in the Lockean sense that their
nature consists of how a normal (that is "reasonable") person
would respond to the action possessing the quality. 6' In the case of
self-defense in the criminal law, conduct by the aggressor that
threatens imminent death or serious bodily harm triggers a right to
take potentially lethal defensive actions. Whether the aggressor's
conduct possesses this quality of threateningness depends on
whether the aggressor deliberately engaged in conduct that a rea-
sonable person would regard as presenting a high risk of imminent
death or serious bodily harm. Thus, for example, an aggressor who
points a real gun at the head of another and begins to pull the trig-
ger has engaged in threatening conduct, even if the gun is not
loaded. By contrast, an aggressor who points a banana at the head
of another has not engaged in threatening conduct, even if the in-
tended victim is psychotic and, through no fault of his own, be-
lieves the banana to be a gun. The legal claim was that, while a self-
defense excuse may exist in the second case, a justification does not.
The right to self-defense, under our law, is predicated on the exis-
tence of objectively threatening conduct.
The theoretical advantage of casting the quality of threatening-
ness as a secondary legal quality is that it explains how the right to
self-defense can turn on something objective-not solely in the
mind of the putative self-defender, but in the conduct of the ag-
"See Benjamin C. Zipursky, Self-Defense, Domination, and the Social Contract,
57 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 579, 600 (1996).
16I d.1 See id. at 601-03.
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gressor-but nevertheless recognize that the relevant legal classifi-
cations are ineliminably anthropomorphic and contextualized at
several levels, and more particularly, that law must reference the
way normal individuals perceive or respond to actions, rather than
to underlying qualities of the conduct or events that can be speci-
fied independently of the tendency of normal individuals to re-
spond. Locke negotiated this metaphysical dilemma by defining
secondary qualities. The law resolves a similar dilemma by retain-
ing objectivity and qualities outside the mind while accepting an
essential dependency on response-based categorizations, by utiliz-
ing "secondary legal qualities."
Interestingly, the tort of assault also seems to employ a secon-
dary legal quality. An assault is an intentional act that produces an
apprehension of imminent harmful or offensive touching. The
quality of being the sort of act that produces an apprehension of animminent harmful touching in a reasonable person is the quality
that makes the act an assault. Whether the act has this quality or
lacks it is an objective matter. This is not to say that people can
never disagree as to whether that quality is present or absent in a
given case. Rather, it is to say that the quality is not something in
the mind of the victim, but is rather an aspect of the act itself, al-
beit an aspect whose nature and existence is defined by a matching
subjective response.
In a different way, the tort of public disclosure of a private fact
also draws upon what we are calling a secondary legal quality.162
Whether something is a private fact is in significant part a secon-
dary legal quality under the law: It is a fact, the disclosure of which
would be highly offensive to a reasonable person. Again, the at-
tribute in question is an attribute of the disclosed fact (for example,
the fact that the plaintiff has genital herpes): it is the attribute of
being the sort of information, the public disclosure of which would
be highly offensive. And yet the essence of the attribute is specified
in terms relating to the response-in this case the emotional re-
sponse-of a reasonable person.
The broader lesson to be drawn from this discussion is that the
harm in certain valid emotional harm cases is not best cast as dam-
age to something in the plaintiff, to wit, her emotional well being.
' See id. at 600-01.
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The injury instead should be cast as interference with the plaintiff's
interest in avoiding certain kinds of circumstances. Once one per-
ceives this, the case law of emotional distress appears less odd and
more aligned with other aspects of tort law. Consider, for example,
the tort of false imprisonment. That tort involves intentionally cre-
ating a situation in which a plaintiff would reasonably take herself
to be confined."3 Freedom from confinement is, needless to say, a
substantial liberty interest shared by all. Certain acts unjustifiably
interfere with this interest and are therefore invasions of the plain-
tiff's right, as well as being "wrongs" under the tort law. Of course,
the primary effect this tort has on an ordinary person is to cause
them to experience fright, anger, embarrassment, frustration,
and/or other negative feelings. But a cause of action for false im-
prisonment does not identify these as the injuries, nor does it iden-
tify the causing of them as the wrong. Instead, false imprisonment
is a dramatic example of depriving someone of an important lib-
erty, the liberty of movement. The essence of the injury is the dep-
rivation of that liberty.
A similar account can be offered for other torts. Consider, for
example, defamation. The essence of the tortious conduct is the
tarnishing of the plaintiff's reputation, and the injury is an injury to
reputation."M Emotional harm is a predictable consequence, and it
will sometimes be the most obvious consequence and provide the
most significant damages in a defamation action. It is the interfer-
ence with the reputational interest, however, that constitutes the
actionable injury.
Or take the example of nuisance. The tortious wrong is an inter-
ference with a proprietary interest, the interest in use and enjoy-
ment of one's property.' Apart from injunctive relief, the classic
remedy for nuisance has been damages equal to the diminution in
value of the property caused by the nuisance. Nevertheless, for
many decades damages for emotional harm have also been avail-
able, on the theory that the disruption of enjoyment of one's life
caused by nuisances are actionable. The character of the remedy
notwithstanding, the wrong of nuisance is not the infliction of emo-
"3 See Dobbs, supra note 19, § 37, at 67-68.
'6 See id. § 400, at 1117.
"6'Id. § 463, at 1321.
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tional distress itself, but the interference with the plaintiff's prop-
erty interest.
Privacy torts consist of the same dual nature. No doubt, what
animated Warren and Brandeis' thinking, at least in part, was the
significance of the harm to the individual's sensibility caused by in-
vasions of privacy." But the wrong of the tort is not itself the inflic-
tion of the harm. The tort instead involves interference with a par-
ticular kind of liberty interest: a freedom from intrusions of a
certain sort, and as Dean Prosser later elaborated, an interest in
freedom from disclosures and misappropriations.67 The wrongs
themselves are definable in terms of the defendant's objective acts
that are realized in certain kinds of actual interference with the
plaintiff's interests, even though that interference is typically ac-
companied by certain kinds of subjective harm as well.
Finally, it is worth noting that many of the "legal wrongs" recog-
nized by American jurisdictions in the second-half of the twentieth
century are similar to the torts just mentioned. They do not involve
damage to bodily integrity or property, but are nevertheless inter-
ferences with valuable interests and are typically accompanied by
emotional harm. These wrongs include eavesdropping, sexual har-
assment, disability discrimination, stalking, and certain instances of
wrongful discharge. Legislatures have tended to create these causes
of action within statutes that regulate by means other than private
rights of action, so it is easy to overlook that these are, in some re-
spects, contemporary torts.
E. Reconceiving Fear-of-Future-Disease Claims
The secondary legal quality apparatus affords a solution to the
dilemma posed above. A defendant who negligently creates a
heightened risk of a disease, under certain circumstances, may be
negligently creating a substantial threat of serious illness. The
threateningness of the circumstances that the defendant creates is a
secondary legal quality of those circumstances. Its nature is consti-
tuted by the fact that a reasonable person would apprehend, from
these circumstances, a substantial threat of contracting a serious
disease in the future. This apprehension will typically go hand-in-
'66 Warren & Brandeis, supra note 8, at 196; see also Prosser, supra note 7, at 389.
6 Prosser, supra note 7, at 389.
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hand with fear and other emotional responses. But the threatening
situation is itself an objective state of affairs whose qualities are not
dependent upon a plaintiff's agency. Moreover, the interest pro-
tected, in the first instance, is an interest in being free from a cer-
tain kind of threat of disease rather than an interest in emotional
tranquility per se. "The justification for permitting recovery for
'fear of' is that the plaintiff suffers, since '[1]ike the sword of Da-
mocles, [plaintiff] knows not when it will fall."""'
A person who is wrongly subjected to a significant threat of a se-
rious disease has been harmed in very important respects. A cloud
has been placed over her life, and one can imagine that cloud of
impending death intruding on her life significantly. Particularly if
the risk is associated with an infectious and potentially fatal dis-
ease, the pall cast not only by the reduced prospects for normal
life-expectancy, but also by the risk of infection, might undermine
her self-confidence and cause her to alter significantly her plans,
relationships, and activities. Moreover, just as false imprisonment
causes a spatial confinement and thereby deprives one of an impor-
tant form of liberty, so this cloud of impending disease constitutes
a temporal confinement. The case law in this area illustrates the
point. A Hawaii Supreme Court decision rendering distress based
on exposure actionable reasoned that a plaintiff exposed to a
pathogen or toxin may recover when "a reasonable person would
foreseeably be unable to cope with the mental stress engendered
by an actual, direct, imminent, and potentially life-endangering
threat to his or her physical safety."'69 Accordingly, the court held
that a cause of action exists if "the negligent behavior of a defen-
dant subjects an individual to an actual, direct, imminent, and po-
tentially life-endangering threat to his or her physical safety by vir-
tue of exposure to HIV."'17
Working within standard analysis, the Hawaii court not surpris-
ingly cast this cause of action as a claim for pure NIED. Yet it
seems much more plausible to treat the claim like one for false im-
prisonment or defamation, with the plaintiff's emotional distress
s Eagle-Picher Indus. v. Cox, 481 So.2d 517, 527 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985) (quoting
Alley v. Charlotte Pipe & Foundry Co., 74 S.E. 885, 886 (N.C. 1912)).
" John & Jane Roes, 1-100 v. FHP, Inc., 985 P.2d 661, 666 (Haw. 1999) (citing
Bramer v. Dotson, 437 S.E.2d 773 (W. Va. 1993)).
170 Id.
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being compensated as a consequence of the invasion of an interest,
rather than as constitutive of the interest itself. The plaintiff who is
falsely imprisoned but remains unflapped still has a cause of action,
for she has still been deprived of her important liberty interest. It
seems plausible to say the same of a person who operates under
the right sort of threat of disease, but remains unflapped.
It is a platitude in contemporary legal theory that what consti-
tutes an injury is a normative matter, and our discussion on that
point makes this platitude palpable. Undoubtedly it is tempting to
treat what we have dubbed the "cloud" or "pall" associated with
threat of illness as boiling down to probabilities: If the likelihood of
the disease reaches a certain threshold, then it is actionable as a
negligently created threat; otherwise it is not. But this is too facile.
No doubt, percentage likelihood matters-the more remote the
possibility, the less is it plausible to say that the defendant's negli-
gence is responsible (as opposed to the plaintiff) for the resulting
pall. Indeed, we will suggest that the low percentage increase in
risk in Buckley was important to the Supreme Court's dismissal of
the emotional distress claim brought there. But the question is not
strictly factual. Whether the threat of disease and the interferences
described constitute something significant enough to count as an
"injury" seems to call for a more general account of what goods are
needed for a life to go well or to be going well.' In this respect, it
resembles the question of what sorts of conditions constitute a
"disability": It is a normative question that hinges on an assessment
of the capacities and activities that are important to a person's life
going well. We do not presume to address these issues. We merely
note that the issue requires a normative judgment, made against
the (usually unarticulated) conception of a life going reasonably
well, and that it is not implausible that certain examples of "threat
of a disease" could be viewed as such an interference as to support
a cause of action for negligence.
' Here courts might draw some guidance from modem disability law, and its con-
ception of situations and conditions that substantially limit "major life activities." See
Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184 (2002) (discussing conditions
that substantially limit major life activity); Samuel R. Bagenstos, Subordination,
Stigma, and "Disability," 86 Va. L. Rev. 397, 445-47 (2000) (arguing that the statutory
definition of disability should incorporate a conception of what it is to lead a "nor-
mal" life).
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The existence of a cognizable injury will also depend to a certain
extent on how responsible the defendant's conduct was for creating
the plaintiff's state of affairs. Without accepting as a given the
Holmesian spectrum from intentionality to negligence to strict li-
ability, that spectrum will be convenient for the present discussion.
Indeed, as readers have probably noticed, many of the examples in
our discussion, such as the idea of being under a cloud or threat,
have involved actions that are usually brought in response to inten-
tional wrongs: intentional assaults and false imprisonments, for ex-
ample. Certainly, decisions in risk-of-disease cases such as Potter
reflect a tendency among courts to be more willing to recognize a
cause of action where the defendant's conduct arrives at, or even
inches toward, intentional, knowing, or reckless maintenance of
such a risk." Nor is this surprising. First, the monitoring costs re-
quired to avoid causing these injuries are much lower than they
would be in negligence; the issue is not the sometimes delicate one
of ensuring that one is acting with reasonable care, but rather re-
quires only that the actor avoid purposefully or knowingly expos-
ing another to a risk of injury. This means, in turn, that the diminu-
tion of the defendant's liberty is less substantial than it is under a
regime of negligence-based liability. Second, the idea that the
plaintiff's injury is something for which the defendant is responsi-
ble is much more plausible where the defendant has set out to
cause this result, for the defendant's agency far overshadows that
of the plaintiff in such scenarios. Third, although we generally shy
away from any easy slippage from moral to legal, the intentional or
reckless causing of such an interference is quite easily regarded as a
moral wrong, and (as is indicated below) it is far from clear
whether this is true in negligence.
As we have indicated in prior Sections and previous articles, the
duty element in negligence law bears significant weight when plain-
tiffs seek to recover for injuries other than physical harm or prop-
erty damage.73 Pure economic harm and pure emotional harm are
the two most notorious thickets within duty law, but the substantial
threat of serious disease area should also be thorny. The threshold
question in each of these areas is whether defendants are obligated
See infra note 222 and accompanying text.See Goldberg & Zipursky, The Place of Duty, supra note 6, at 668-72.
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to be vigilant of the possibility of injuring plaintiff in this respect.
The baseline or default is that, in the case of physical injury, there
is an obligation to all others to take reasonable care not to cause
such an injury through affirmative conduct. As for other kinds of
harm, it is not obvious that there is such a general obligation, al-
though these sorts of obligations attach in certain contexts and re-
lationships. Moreover, as we have argued, and as Mark Geistfeld
has eloquently elaborated from a different point of view in this
Volume, part of the role played by the notion of obligation within
our moral psychology is that it is important if duty is to function at
all that it prioritize certain interests above others.' This prioritiza-
tion is not consistent with finding a general obligation to be vigilant
of all kinds of harm.
Of course, negligence is a broader tort than false imprisonment,
assault, defamation, and invasion of privacy. An interesting ques-
tion is whether the more carefully drawn contours of those other
torts permit them to protect special sorts of interests without un-
duly cutting into the prioritization of physical well-being that negli-
gence law requires. To put the point the other way around (and
probably more accurately, historically), it is plausible that negli-
gence has been able to develop as a broad supplement to specific
torts only because the duty of due care as a general obligation has
been limited to physical injuries caused by misfeasance. Whichever
way the point is put, however, negligence law has progressed by
pushing duty beyond misfeasance and physical harm. Courts have
generally tried to do this incrementally, in a manner that preserves
the notion of obligation, meshes plausibly with social and profes-
sional norms, does not interfere greatly with other institutions or
branches of law, and remains manageable within the judicial sys-
tem. 5
The questions at hand are therefore whether and when defen-
dants should be viewed by courts as having a duty to others to be
vigilant not to cause them to be under a cloud of serious disease.
As argued in prior Sections, it is not enough to argue that there is a
174 See Geistfeld, supra note 69; Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 1830-39.
"-'See Goldberg & Zipursky, The Place of Duty, supra note 6, at 740 (describing
considerations relevant to duty analysis).
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duty not to cause the target disease.16 It is, to speak metaphori-
cally, the injury of the "cloud" or "threat" for which we envision
plaintiff recovering. Therefore, the duty established must be a duty
to be vigilant not to cause this cloud or threat.
Who has such a duty, and to whom? To some extent, this is an is-
sue that jurisdictions must answer on a case by case basis, but
this-rather than questions of floodgates and fraud-is the ques-
tion courts should be asking. Some cases also present themselves as
much stronger than others. A hospital-particularly one that treats
a significant number of HIV patients-seems to have a duty to its
patients and to its sanitary workers to be vigilant not to expose
them to the risk of a needle stick that may expose one of them to
HIV. On the other hand, it is less obvious that a used car dealer
owes a duty to future users to make sure they are not exposed to
HIV from debris hidden inside the car." An intermediate, and
very difficult question, is whether the duty to be vigilant of causing
a threat of HIV infection involves a duty not to cause actual expo-
sure to HIV or a duty not to cause possible exposure through a
medically possible means of transmission. Perhaps the best course
is to follow courts that have availed themselves of burden-shifting
to ease this difficult dilemma."8
Although the toxic exposure cases present equally challenging
questions, our aim here is merely to find a sufficiently rich and
principled framework for asking the questions, not to prove that
one particular answer ought to prevail in every jurisdiction. For ex-
ample, a powerful argument can be made that an industry produc-
ing hazardous waste or radiation has a duty to the inhabitants of
,' See Boyles v. Kerr, 855 S.W.2d 593 (Tex. 1993) (holding that an independent duty
is required).
" See, e.g., Cole v. D.J. Quirk, Inc., 2001 Mass. App. Div. 139, 142 (2001) (adopting
actual exposure rule to reject claim of persons who were stuck by surgical tweezers in
used car).
178 See, e.g., S. Cent. Reg'l Med. Ctr. v. Pickering, 749 So. 2d 95, 102 (Miss. 1999)
(shifting the burden of proof against actual exposure to the defendant after the plain-
tiff had shown possible exposure in a diabetic lancet case). Of course, fear-of-AIDS
claims must also be limited by the so-called "window of anxiety"--the period between
exposure and the time at which medical tests can rule out infection. Id. at 103. As
faster, reliable tests become available, the scope of liability in this area will shrink ac-
cordingly.
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nearby towns not to create a substantial threat of cancer."9 It will
be a difficult question, however, what constitutes such a threat;
similarly, it will be a difficult question whether defense contractors
have a parallel duty not to cause the threat of serious disease to all
those who might be affected by their weaponry, and to their de-
scendants.
Perhaps the best way to bring our analysis of emotional distress
claims to closure is to return to the decision with which this Article
started: Buckley. The plaintiff's case seems initially compelling be-
cause Metro-North's conduct was negligent, and perhaps worse.
And yet FELA provides private rights of action for injured plain-
tiffs; it is a tort statute, not a regulatory law. The Court rightly
looked beyond Metro-North's wrongful conduct to see whether
Buckley was genuinely seeking redress for an injury, that is,
whether Metro-North's wrong was realized in an injury.
Buckley argued that his exposure to asbestos was itself an im-
pact, which supported an action for personal injury." ° On reflec-
tion, it should be clear that this "impact" constituted what we have
called an "intermediate harm." To be sure, it stopped Metro-North
from asserting that its negligence was merely "in the air"; it was lit-
erally in Buckley himself. But it was not cancer. Even if it had the
potential to become that disease, it had not yet ripened. For rea-
sons both pragmatic and principled, Justice Breyer rightly noted
that it was inadvisable and alien to negligence law to treat such un-
ripened injuries as a basis for a right of action.' Moreover, he
rightly resisted the temptation to adopt an even more minimal, and
arbitrary, rendition of the impact rule."
1 "See Day v. NLO, 851 F. Supp. 869 (S.D. Ohio 1994) (permitting recovery for fear
of cancer).1 Buckley, 521 U.S. at 428.
'Id. at 430.
.The petitioner's argument in Norfolk & Western Railway Co. v. Ayers, 122 S.Ct.
1434 (2002) (mem.), can be characterized in at least two ways. On the one hand, it
might be construed as an invitation to the Court to abandon the predicate/parasitic
distinction. In our view, that invitation should be declined. The Court has repeatedly
maintained that FELA must be interpreted in light of common law, and the distinc-
tion is a sound and well-settled feature of that law.
On the other hand, it may pose the question of whether the form of asbestosis al-
leged is in fact so minimal as to be nothing more than an "impact" of the sort Buckley
found insufficient to support a claim for fear of future disease. We take no position on
whether this latter characterization is correct.
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The question therefore becomes whether there is a sense in
which Metro-North, in negligently exposing Buckley to asbestos
and thereby enhancing the likelihood that he would get cancer, was
causing not only an intermediate harm, but an ultimate harm; not
simply a realizable tort but a realized one. Buckley's claim that he
was emotionally injured was an effort to make exactly such a claim.
Citing reasons of credibility and floodgates, the Court rejected
Buckley's claim, and with it, the idea of liability for exposure
alone."
It is easy to see that Buckley's own claim of emotional harm was
weak. A heavy smoker who never sought psychiatric or psycho-
logical treatment, Buckley's fear of cancer claim was tenuous on
the facts. Even Justice Ginsburg recognized this, and (on that
point) concurred in the denial of relief." Yet, as the dissent
pointed out, it is far from clear why there ought to be a denial of
relief across the board for such claims simply because Buckley's
own claim was weak.'85 And in the face of a wealthy and negligent
defendant, and a recent decision in Gotshall expressing openness in
principle to damages for emotional harm under FELA,'" the
Court's wholesale refusal to recognize a cause of action rang hol-
low.
We have argued above that unrealized toxic-exposure cases
should be viewed in a different light-not as fear-of-disease cases
but as objectively based threat-of-disease cases. This account ex-
plains both why Buckley was in some ways a close case and also
why it was ultimately correctly decided on this issue. Buckley was
close because on a key issue-duty-the plaintiff's position was
strong. An employer like Metro-North, given the state of medical
knowledge in the 1980s, very plausibly owed a duty not only to be
vigilant against causing its employees certain serious diseases, but
also a duty to be careful not to cause a substantial threat of those
diseases. In other words, the objective circumstances of being in
working conditions that cause one to live under the cloud of im-
pending disease are circumstances an employer plausibly has an
obligation to take care not to cause to its employees. Metro-North
' Buckley, 521 U.S. at 433-34.
.Id. at 444.
'8'Id. at 445,454 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
18 Id.
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took no such care. To that extent, Buckley's claim-though novel-
appears strong.
On the other hand, as Justice Breyer seems to have recognized,
Buckley's particular claim was quite weak." This is not simply be-
cause he did not seem very anxious about his risk of cancer," but
because the "threat of cancer" to which Buckley was exposed sim-
ply was not very significant. Although Metro-North's conduct may
have been wrongful, and Buckley should not have been placed in
the circumstances in which he was placed, Buckley was not placed
under a serious threat by this conduct. Indeed, his own experts tes-
tified that the increased risk of cancer was from 1% to 5% (Justice
Breyer supposed, hypothetically, that Buckley's risk of cancer
moved from 23% to 28%). " While it is not always easy to find the
right numbers in a case such as this, there is little plausibility to the
assertion that a marginal increase of a few percentage points in an
already substantial risk of cancer-while surely of concern to the
person subjected to the increase-converts a situation that was
psychologically tolerable into one in which the person finds herself
under "Damocles' sword." At the end of the day, there was no in-
jury in Buckley-no tort at all. Thus, even if Buckley had presented
evidence that he was significantly distressed, he should not have
been permitted recovery because that distress could not fairly be
imputed to the circumstances created by the defendant's negligent
conduct. To impose liability for such a small increment of increased
risk would truly be to regulate under the guise of tort, rather than
to provide recourse for a person who has suffered a realized wrong.
IV. MEDICAL MONITORING CLAIMS
Suits seeking reimbursement for medical monitoring expenses
provide yet another way to frame claims in tort for heightened risk
of future physical injury or illness. Here, again, we have to be care-
ful about what sort of claims we have in mind. Medical monitoring
suits refer to actions in which the cost of medical monitoring is the
only cognizable injury alleged by the plaintiff. Thus, we do not ad-
'
7 Id. at 427.
" Id. at 428 (noting the trial court's finding that Buckley presented little evidence of
real emotional injury).
'9 Id. at 427, 435.
17012002]
Virginia Law Review
dress suits seeking reimbursement for medical monitoring expenses
as damages parasitic on some other injury, such as a physical in-
jury. The latter suits raise issues in the law of remedies, but typi-
cally there is no obstacle (beyond issues of proof) to recovery of
medical monitoring expenses. For example, a plaintiff whose heart
valve is damaged as a result of ingesting a defectively or negligently
designed product would ordinarily be entitled to recover the ex-
pected cost of annual tests to monitor the deterioration of the
valve."9 The same analysis would presumably apply to cases falling
within the "penumbral" category described in Section III.B. If a
negligence plaintiff can establish that she is actually under a threat
of serious illness as a proximate result of defendant's carelessness,
then, in principle, she ought-like the plaintiff with the damaged
heart valve-to be able to recover for the expected medical moni-
toring expenses necessitated by the threat.
In short, medical monitoring claims are akin to claims for en-
hanced risks of future injury, except that they seek to recover the
expected cost of preventive medical treatment necessitated by an-
other's wrongful conduct rather than a percentage of the value of
the ultimate harm expected to flow from that conduct. We have
said earlier that the common law governing negligence and prod-
ucts liability does not ordinarily treat increased risk as an injury in
and of itself. Yet clearly many medical monitoring plaintiffs are
prevailing in the courts. Thus, we need to consider whether they
are entitled to prevail and, if so, on what grounds.
A. Uncertainty over the Nature of Medical Monitoring Claims
Genuine medical monitoring claims have become an important
part of the torts landscape. Presumably, this is a function of a
heightened sensitivity to both the presence of toxins in everyday
'9 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 924(c) (1979) ("One whose interests of per-
sonality have been tortiously invaded is entitled to recover damages for... prospec-
tive... (c) reasonable medical and other expenses .... "). To draw a sharp contrast,
consider a case in which C Corp. carelessly operates a factory so as to introduce vast
amounts of a known carcinogen into a neighboring town's water supply. If we suppose
that the residents' exposure to the carcinogen increased their risk of contracting a
form of cancer to 1 in 10 from a background risk of 1 in 1,000, the residents might
fairly complain of being under the sort of threat that would support recovery of dam-
ages for fear of future illness.
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life and to the perceived link between those toxins and certain inju-
ries. Equally, it may reflect the problems of proof that have given
rise to loss-of-chance and enhanced risk claims. Many toxic tort
plaintiffs cannot establish as more probable than not a general
causal link between a given product or course of conduct and a
given injury or illness. This information gap usually defeats claims
for physical injury. It may even defeat claims for emotional dis-
tress, since the absence of evidence of a causal link might render
the emotional distress unreasonable as a matter of law. Medical
monitoring claims do not, in principle, require plaintiffs to establish
that they are under a significant threat of injury or illness; rather,
they only require plaintiffs to establish that a reasonable regime of
preventive medicine would include periodic tests to detect the on-
set of the illness."'
Pure medical monitoring claims have also arisen in part because
of particular aspects of the law of civil procedure. Medical monitor-
ing claims are often brought as class actions on behalf of all per-
sons who ingested a particular medication or were exposed to a
particular toxin. The traditional mass tort class action attempts to
certify a class under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3),
which requires that common questions of law and fact "predomi-
nate" over individualized issues.1" Courts of Appeals and the Su-
preme Court have, however, cast suspicion on the invocation of
Rule 23(b)(3) for mass tort class actions, given that common ques-
tions (for example, whether a given product was defectively de-
signed) are often overwhelmed by individual issues such as compli-
ance with statutes of limitations, causation of particular plaintiffs'
injuries, damages, comparative fault, and assumption of risk." In
response, some lawyers have sought class certification for medical
monitoring claims under Rule 23(b)(2), which authorizes class ac-
tions on the ground that the defendant has "acted or refused to act
on grounds generally applicable to the class, thereby making ap-
propriate final injunctive relief or corresponding declaratory relief
191 See, e.g., Ayers v. Jackson Township, 525 A.2d 287, 304 (N.J. 1987) (distinguish-
ing claims for enhanced risk from claims for medical monitoring).
, Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).
"See Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 624 (1997) (quoting Georgine v.
Amchem Products, 83 F.3d 610, 626 (3d Cir. 1996)).
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with respect to the class as a whole."'94 The theory behind this sort
of claim is that such suits are not seeking damage payments per
se-which would bar certification under 23(b)(2)-but rather are
asking the court to enjoin a defendant who has put a class of plain-
tiffs at heightened risk of developing a disease to establish a fund
or program by which class members can pay for medical monitor-
ing of their risk.
Friends for AI7 Children v. Lockheed Aircraft Corp. is sometimes
cited as announcing the arrival of medical monitoring as a cogniza-
ble harm.'95 There, the court upheld a district court decision order-
ing the defendant to create a fund to pay for neurologic testing of
children placed at risk of injury by the decompression and crash of
the defendant's plane.'96 Subsequent to Lockheed, the New Jersey
and California Supreme Courts endorsed medical monitoring
claims in cases alleging heightened risk of cancer due to localized
environmental contamination. These decisions, Ayers v. Jackson
Township'9' and Potter v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co.,'98 have
emerged as the leading authorities in the area.
To say that medical monitoring claims are important and have
been recognized by influential state supreme courts is not to say
that courts have settled on an adequate understanding of these
claims. In fact, these claims have raised many complex issues of
both substantive and procedural law. What degree of heightened
risk is required before a claim will be recognized? Is this determi-
nation medical or legal? Does class certification under Rule
23(b)(2) permit an end-run around the strictures of Rule 23(b)(3)
by allowing plaintiffs first to obtain certification for purposes of
equitable relief, then to secure a cash settlement with a value that
is affected by the certification decision? Under the rules against
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(2).
'9'746 F.2d 816 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
961 Id.; see generally Arvin Maskin et al., Medical Monitoring: A Viable Remedy for
Deserving Plaintiffs or Tort Law's Most Expensive Consolation Prize?, 27 Wm.
Mitchell L. Rev. 521 (2000) (describing the relevant case law).
525 A.2d 287 (N.J. 1987).
863 P.2d 795 (Cal. 1993).
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claim-splitting, does recovery of medical monitoring costs preclude
a later suit for realized injuries such as cancer?'
We are not in a position to take on these issues in the present
discussion. Rather, as indicated at the outset, we aspire to isolate
the substance of typical medical monitoring causes of actions in the
hope that doing so will help resolve these and other issues swirling
around medical monitoring suits. Courts, understandably, have not
yet settled on a satisfactory account of the nature of medical moni-
toring claims. Some have simply denied the viability of medical
monitoring suits as presenting cognizable claims in tort.' The deep
ambivalence expressed by the Supreme Court in Buckley, however,
is more illustrative of the problems of characterization that medical
monitoring suits pose.
As noted at the outset, the Buckley majority--concerned about
the sheer amount of potential liability, as well as the problem of
giving de facto priority to claims by the as-yet-uninjured over
claims by the injured-showed a strong inclination to reject such
claims under FELA.0 ' Yet, "enigmatically," it refused to slam the
door on them. Instead the Court left open the possibility that such
claims would be actionable if a court entertaining the claims or-
dered the right manner of remedy, namely the establishment of a
fund from which patients could obtain ongoing reimbursement for
medical monitoring expenses rather than a lump-sum payment.'
In its ambivalence, the Buckley majority never really came to
grips with the nature of the plaintiff's medical monitoring claim.
Repeatedly, it characterized the claim as one for negligence caus-
, See generally McCall, supra note 66 (noting conflicting decisions on this question
and arguing against the assignment of preclusive effect to successful claims for medi-
cal monitoring).
2®These decisions seem to have been rendered predominantly by federal courts
that, in exercising diversity jurisdiction, are reluctant to develop state tort law. See,
e.g., Ball v. Joy Techs., 958 F.2d 36, 39 (4th Cir. 1991) (requiring proof of a predicate
physical injury); Carroll v. Litton Sys., No. B-C-88-253, 1990 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16833,
at *148-49 (W.D.N.C. Oct. 29, 1990) (denying claim based on increased risk of dis-
ease). For a collection of decisions recognizing and rejecting medical monitoring
claims, see Allan L. Schwartz, Annotation, Recovery of Damages for Expense of
Medical Monitoring to Detect or Prevent Future Disease or Condition, 17 A.L.R.5th
327 (1994).
See supra text accompanying notes 17-25.
See supra text accompanying notes 21-25.
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ing economic loss. 3 As mentioned at the outset, to frame the claim
this way is to link medical monitoring claims such as Buckley's to
actions such as those against accountants for negligent misrepre-
sentation. Yet this linkage is not very satisfactory. In the first place,
Buckley's claim was not for economic losses already experienced,
but for future economic losses he expected to incur.' At a mini-
mum, the suit was premature, at least until Buckley had to pay for
his first set of medical tests. Even then, it is unclear whether an
economic injury of this nature would support recovery of expected
future expenses as parasitic damages.'
More fundamentally, we doubt that claims like Buckley's are vi-
able as claims for pure economic loss. No jurisdiction recognizes a
general duty to take care to avoid causing economic loss to oth-
ers.' Indeed, the dominant rule remains the rule of Robins Dry
Dock and Repair Co. v. Flint: In the absence of damage to physical
property, economic loss is not recoverable absent privity between
the defendant and the plaintiff or some other special relationship
that attests to the defendant have undertaken to be vigilant of the
plaintiff's intangible economic interests.' While it is true that
Metro-North and Buckley maintained an employer-employee rela-
tionship, we doubt that this is the sort of relationship to which a
duty to be vigilant of economic well-being attaches. First, manage-
ment is often under obligations to owners that preclude obligations
to be vigilant of economic losses to employees. (Consider, for ex-
ample, a decision to approve a merger or close a plant, which will
foreseeably cause the loss of jobs.) More to the point, even when
not responding to such obligations, managers retain discretion to
make decisions without regard to their economic impact on em-
ployees. Absent enforceable promises to the contrary, and assum-
203 Buckley, 521 U.S. at 438-40.
204 Id. at 438.2
05 See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 924(c) (1979) (limiting this sort of recovery
to "one whose interests of personality have been... invaded").206 See Dobbs, supra note 19, § 452, at 1282 ("When commercial or economic harm
stands alone, divorced from injury to person or property, courts have not imposed a
general duty of reasonable care. They have instead imposed a duty... mainly when
the parties are in a special relationship and the defendant has implicitly undertaken
such a duty."). Ironically, then-Judge Breyer is the author of a leading opinion on this
issue. See Barber Lines A/S v. M/V Donau Marie, 764 F.2d 50, 54-55 (1st Cir. 1985).
... See Robins Dry Dock & Repair Co. v. Flint, 275 U.S. 303,308-09 (1927).
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ing they have not made decisions in a discriminatory or otherwise
unlawful manner, if the managers of a firm decide to move their
operations across town so as to force their employees to endure
longer and more expensive commutes or to pay higher taxes, there
would be no cause of action even if the decision was careless as to
the employees' economic interests. The same would hold true if
they were to shut down the office child care center, thus forcing
certain members of the workforce to quit or work reduced hours.
Likewise, if management decided, for business reasons, to switch
the company's health plan from one insurer to another, thereby in-
creasing employees' deductibles and reducing their coverage, no
cause of action in negligence would accrue.
To point to these examples is not to say that employers owe no
obligations to their employees. Employers owe employees what
they have promised them. They also owe duties set by federal and
state statutes and regulations with respect to nondiscrimination,
workplace safety, etc. In addition (discussed below), employers
owe employees various duties in tort. For example, as Buckley ac-
knowledges, employers sometimes owe employees a duty to avoid
causing situations that generate emotional distress.2" Rather, all we
aim to have established is the implausibility of the proposition that
employers such as Metro-North have an obligation to be vigilant
not to cause intangible economic harm to their employees. If we
are correct about this, it tells us that medical monitoring claims are
not on sound footing when cast as claims for economic loss, as they
were in Buckley.2' If they are to be recognized, they must be rec-
ognized on some other doctrinal ground. Otherwise, they revert to
the status of claims for pure enhanced risk of physical injury, and
invoke the general rule in tort law that heightened risk, in and of
itself, is not a cognizable harm.21°
Apart from the primary duty question, there is a second anoma-
lous feature of Buckley, hammered home by Justice Ginsburg in
her dissent, concerning the majority's apparent conflation of right
and remedy. Previous decisions on which Buckley relied, including
Ayers and Potter, had suggested that a lump-sum payment was a
See supra text accompanying notes 16-17.
See supra text accompanying notes 65-71 (discussing the general absence of a
duty to avoid causing intermediate harms).
21 'See supra text accompanying note 10.
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less desirable form of relief than some sort of structured payment
scheme. Neither, however, insisted on this form of remedy. In
Ayers, the New Jersey Supreme Court declined to impose that
remedy in the case at hand, suggesting instead that it should be the
"general rule" in future medical monitoring suits against public en-
tities.21' Potter merely noted its advantages.2 2 In this respect, both
are consistent with the conventional notion, expressed by Justice
Ginsburg, that the issue as to whether medical monitoring is a vi-
able cause of action is wholly distinct from the question of how to
structure the remedy."3 The former is determined by the legal rules
setting out the elements of the cause of action; the latter is typically
left to the discretion of the trial court. Buckley, by contrast, seems
to build the form of relief into the substance of the cause of action:
A medical monitoring claim is viable only if the remedy consists of
the establishment of a fund rather than the payment of lump-sum
damages.
In sum, the oddity of Buckley is not its decision to restrict claims
for medical monitoring. As noted earlier, the majority was moti-
vated by important considerations of policy. Rather, the oddity re-
sides in the way in which the Court's policy concerns were trans-
lated into tort law via FELA. By focusing on the economic injury
and the issue of remedy, the Court seems to have rendered a deci-
sion that does not "carve at the joint." Instead, it appears to
achieve an ad hoc compromise between principle (which tells us
that Buckley has suffered a cognizable wrong in the form of negli-
gent infliction of economic loss) and policy (which tells us that the
Buckleys of the world should not recover because of the threat of
too much liability and the prioritization problem). Like the old pri-
vacy decisions Dean Prosser studied, Buckley indicates that the
cause of action for medical monitoring is as yet inadequately real-
ized.214
21'Ayers, 525 A.2d at 314-15.
212 Potter, 863 P.2d at 825 n.28.
213 Buckley, 521 U.S. at 455-56 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
214 See Prosser, supra note 7, at 422-23.
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B. Medical Monitoring and the Duty to Aid the Imperiled
We have expressed doubts concerning the Buckley majority's
characterization of a medical monitoring cause of action as a duty
to avoid causing economic loss. We have also noted that it seems to
conflate right and remedy, but that this conflation was motivated
by legitimate concerns about the scope of liability and the priority
to be accorded claims of actual injury versus claims for monitoring
expenses. Thus, to this point, we might fairly be taken to be argu-
ing that the right realization to have about medical monitoring
claims is that courts ought never to recognize them. That, however,
is not our position. In fact, we are inclined to think that the Buck-
ley majority was right to link the form of the remedy to the under-
lying right of action, although it did not adequately explain why.
Once this link is better understood, the true doctrinal basis for a
medical monitoring claim emerges.
The key here is to realize that defendants who are ordered to
underwrite medical tests for those whom they have put at risk of
physical injury should not be understood as providing a compensa-
tory payment for injuries already realized, economic or otherwise.
This is because, at least on facts such as Buckley's, they have not
yet committed a tort. Of course, when one sees money changing
hands in the context of a tort suit, one naturally thinks in terms of
compensation. Ordinarily, payment is made in satisfaction of what
is sometimes described as a secondary duty of repair. It is described
as secondary, because it attaches as the result of a violation of a
primary duty not to cause an injury through wrongful conduct.215 In
this instance, however, appearances are misleading. Payment in a
tort context need not always be in satisfaction of a secondary duty
to compensate for a completed wrong. Rather, payment might also
be a way of performing a certain kind of primary duty owed by a
defendant to a plaintiff. And this is more likely to be the case when
payment comes in the form of a fund issuing periodic payments
rather than a lump-sum transfer: The mode of payment bespeaks
an ongoing obligation, rather than a one time satisfaction of a debt
owed in light of a wrong already done.
215 Jules L. Coleman, Tort Law and the Demands of Corrective Justice, 67 Ind. L.J.
349,367 (1992).
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Recasting payment of medical monitoring expenses as the per-
formance of a primary duty of conduct rather than the fulfillment
of a secondary duty to compensate might seem to get us out of the
frying pan and into the fire. If such payments constitute the per-
formance of a primary duty, then the duty in question must be one
of affirmative aid, as opposed to a duty to take care to avoid caus-
ing injury. Notoriously, the common law of tort is, and has long
been, quite stingy about recognizing such affirmative duties. There
is no general duty to protect or rescue through affirmative conduct,
as opposed to a duty to refrain from acts that injure a person.21 6
Why, given the paucity of affirmative duties recognized by the
common law, should we suppose that we have found an adequate
ground for medical monitoring claims by reconceiving them in
terms of an affirmative primary duty?
The answer lies in the fact that one of the well-recognized excep-
tions to the general rule against affirmative duties is the duty owed
by one who has created a dangerous condition that renders another
in peril and hence in need of affirmative aid.27 A storeowner who
would otherwise not owe an affirmative duty of reasonable care to
a person in the store may incur a duty to take steps to aid the per-
son if she is injured by an instrumentality or employee of the
store.2"8 Furthermore, if a person buys narcotics for another, she
has a duty to assist the other if he requires medical attention as a
result of using the drugs. 9 Or suppose D, driving his car at night,
runs another driver, P, off the road without causing injury to P or
his car. D then drives off without attempting to help P by, for ex-
ample, shining his headlights in P's direction so that P can assess
the situation. P falls down a steep embankment and is injured, and
can show that he would not have fallen had D shone his headlights
on the accident scene. D will be liable to P because, once having
placed him in peril, he was obligated to take steps to protect P
from the peril.
Metro-North was in an analogous position to these defendants
vis-, -vis its employee Buckley. By causing Buckley to be exposed
216 Dobbs, supra note 19, § 314, at 853.
211 Id. § 316, at 856-57.
218 L.S. Ayres & Co. v. Hicks, 40 N.E.2d 334,337-38 (Ind. 1942).
219Heffern v. Perry, No. 420713,2000 Conn. Super. LEXIS 2708, at *1 (Conn. Super.
Ct. Oct. 11, 2000).
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to substantial amounts of airborne asbestos in the workplace, it
subjected him to physical peril. At that point, the company in-
curred a primary duty to Buckley to take reasonable measures to
help him avoid realizing the peril. By paying for the medical moni-
toring necessitated by the exposure, Metro-North fulfills that duty.
Providing such monitoring, or the money to fund such monitoring,
is not a symbolic, retrospective form of redress for an (economic)
injury done. It is a forward-looking act that Metro-North is obli-
gated to perform in light of having created the situation in which
such an act is needed to minimize the risk of injury. Thus, Buck-
ley's suit, properly conceived, was not seeking redress for a com-
pleted wrong, but an injunction ordering Metro-North to attend to
a duty that, if left unattended and if later linked to a genuinely
cognizable harm, would then (and only then) ripen into a tort.
Our reconstruction of medical monitoring claims in terms of
seeking to enjoin performance of a primary duty rather than seek-
ing compensation for a completed wrong better captures three as-
pects that have thus far remained unilluminated by judicial analy-
sis. First, it explains, at the level of doctrine, the plausibility of
these claims. Cast as compensatory payments for injuries already
suffered, medical monitoring awards are styled as compensation
for either economic losses or heightened risk of future physical in-
jury. Yet, the latter is ordinarily non-cognizable in negligence, and
the former is forced and implausible in attributing to defendants
such as employers a duty to be vigilant not to cause economic
losses to their employees. By contrast, the description of medical
monitoring payments as fulfilling a primary duty provides an accu-
rate description of the nature of the wrong and the nature of the
duty in these cases. It is plausible for a court to say to Metro-North:
"You have done wrong by carelessly imperiling your employee,
now it is your responsibility to take steps to reduce the likelihood
that this peril is realized, or to mitigate the severity of the harm ex-
perienced if it is realized."
Second, our reconstruction renders intelligible the otherwise
mysterious linkage drawn in Buckley between right and remedy.
Buckley itself treated structured payments as an ad hoc limitation
designed to serve the policy goals of reducing overall liability for
medical monitoring claims. By contrast, on the present account, it
is precisely because the duty owed by the defendant is the duty to
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provide for monitoring-rather than the secondary duty to pay
compensation-that lump-sum payment is inappropriate as com-
pared to periodic payments as monitoring costs are incurred. In-
deed, scheduled payments appear, in this light, to be much more
sensible than a one-time, lump-sum payment.
Third, our account makes sense of the efforts to plead medical
monitoring claims as class actions under Rule 23(b)(2). Class
members in these cases are asking for an equitable remedy, rather
than a damage award. By way of duty determination, they are ask-
ing the court to determine that the defendant has put them in peril
and therefore has incurred a duty to take care to minimize their
peril. By way of relief, they ask the court to order the defendant to
heed that duty by paying for medical monitoring on an ongoing ba-
sis.
Our "solution" to the puzzle of medical monitoring claims may
strike some readers as contrived. In fact, we think it integrates
these claims into the existing fabric of tort law quite well. We ac-
knowledge, however, that the fit may seem awkward in three re-
spects. First, in terms of substantive doctrine, the duty to aid those
whom one has imperiled attaches even when the imperilment is in-
nocent, rather than wrongful. Thus, in the foregoing example of the
driver, D's duty to help P would attach even if D was driving with
all reasonable care when he ran P off the road.2 By contrast, suits
like those in Ayers, Buckley, and Potter sometimes allege grave
wrongdoing, and, more importantly, the courts seem to take it for
granted that there must be a showing of wrongdoing (at least negli-
gence) before medical monitoring costs will be awarded.
Second, in terms of procedure, affirmative duties such as the
duty to aid those whom one has imperiled are almost always en-
forced after the fact, by means of compensatory payments for inju-
ries flowing from the imperilment. One cannot typically sue for a
positive injunction ordering a rescue effort to be undertaken. (Of
course in many, if not most cases, there is only a momentary lapse
in time between imperilment and injury, so the question does not
usually arise.) Yet, medical monitoring claims seek and obtain eq-
uitable relief prior to injury. Taken together, these differences in
,, See Dobbs, supra note 19, § 316, at 856-57 (noting that the duty to aid applies
even in cases where peril is innocently created).
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substance and procedure pose a third problem, namely the poten-
tially broad reach of our solution to the doctrinal conundrum of
monitoring claims. If the innocent creation of peril to another is
sufficient to obtain a court order requiring payments necessary to
perform the duty to minimize the peril, are we not in danger of in-
viting the aggregate levels of liability, as well as the undesirable
prioritization of claims, that Justice Breyer rightly worried about in
Buckley?
The short answer to the last question is "yes." The duty to aid
those whom one has imperiled would impose substantial burdens
and might well, in limited-fund cases, steer resources to the
"merely" imperiled at the expense of those in whom the peril has
been realized. One might imagine, for example, a class action on
behalf of all non-smokers exposed to substantial levels of tobacco
smoke (such as bartenders or waitstaff) against manufacturers of
cigarettes and cigars for the cost of monitoring for emphysema or
lung cancer. Not only would the expense be enormous, given the
sheer number of plaintiffs, it would likely divert money from those
who have developed those diseases.
Still, recognition of the potential overbreadth problem actually
helps generate answers to the other two puzzles we have just
noted: the problem of the innocent imperiler and the availability of
pre-injury relief. The relief sought by medical monitoring plaintiffs
is equitable in nature. As a matter almost of definition, courts re-
tain broad discretion within their equitable jurisdiction to order
what is just. Recall the earlier Vaughn v. Menlove hypothetical. A
judge faced with a request from Menlove to enjoin Vaughn to
eliminate the dangerously constructed haystack ordinarily will not
issue the injunction unless the haystack is found to constitute a nui-
sance (which, in the facts of the hypothetical, it is not). The law, a
court likely would reason, contains an adequate remedy in the
form of the action for negligence and the payment of after-the-fact
compensatory damages.l Likewise, in most other cases of imper-
" Many scholars, most prominently Professor Laycock, have suggested that, as em-
ployed by the courts, the availability of an adequate remedy at law does not constitute
a ground in and of itself to deny equitable relief. See Douglas Laycock, The Death of
the Irreparable Injury Rule 4 (1991). Insofar as this is meant to suggest only that
judges do not enforce a blanket prohibition against pre-injury equitable relief in tort
cases, we agree. There seems little doubt, however, that courts do not routinely grant
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ilment, the judicial default should be the denial of injunctive relief
in favor of legal remedies after the peril is realized. The potentially
substantial burdens that attach to affirmative duties to minimize
perils, coupled with the fact that the peril has not yet been realized,
and that, if realized, will support a cause of action for the injury,
work together to disfavor, in the ordinary case, the granting of in-
junctive relief.
The balance of equities may change, however, in particular
cases, so as to favor the grant of injunctive relief. If the imperiled
plaintiff can establish that the defendant has not merely innocently
imperiled him, but instead has imperiled him by virtue of wrongful
conduct toward the plaintiff, the defendant's argument against be-
ing enjoined is weakened while the plaintiff's argument for injunc-
tive relief is bolstered. Indeed, in this regard, we note that in Ayers,
Buckley, and Potter, there were allegations not simply of negli-
gence, but of gross negligence bordering on recklessness, which no
doubt aided the case for equitable relief.' Likewise, if the defen-
dant and the imperiled plaintiff are in a pre-existing relationship
within which the defendant already owes the plaintiff certain obli-
gations to protect her well-being, the equities again shift toward
the plaintiff. Finally, if the relationship is one that is already subject
to significant legal regulation designed to protect the plaintiff from
exposure to the risks in question-as workplace hazards are regu-
lated by the Occupational Safety & Health Administration
("OSHA") and the discharge of contaminants is regulated by the
Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") and its state equiva-
lents-there is yet another reason to favor an injunctive remedy. In
such relief in tort cases, and that one of their reasons for doing so is because a post-
injury action may be brought. See 2 Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages-
Equity-Restitution § 8.10, at 535 (2d ed. 1993) (noting the traditional reluctance of
courts to grant injunctive relief in connection with personal injury claims).
22See Buckley, 521 U.S. at 443 (conceding the accuracy of Justice Ginsburg's dis-
sent in describing plaintiff being sympathetic for having suffered a wrong at the hands
of his employer); see id. at 446-47 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (describing the facts and
noting the state agency's conclusion that the employer had "seriously disregarded the
health and safety of its workers," and that the employer's failings were "particularly
egregious"); Potter, 863 P.2d at 818 (relieving the plaintiffs of an obligation to prove
that they were more likely than not to develop illness due to an exposure caused by
the defendant because of the defendant's "conscious disregard of the rights and safety
of others"); Ayers, 525 A.2d at 292 (noting ample evidence that the town operated its
landfill in a "palpably unreasonable" manner).
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this regard, we note that both Justice Breyer for the majority and
Justice Ginsburg in dissent pointed out that OSHA already re-
quired that many employers provide safe workplaces, and even
that they pay for medical monitoring of employees exposed to tox-
ins.
In sum, our characterization of claims for medical monitoring
expenses-claims of the sort upheld in Ayers and perhaps tolerated
in Buckley-as actions by imperiled plaintiffs seeking equitable re-
lief to enforce the defendants' primary duty to minimize the peril
does not "prove too much." Instead, it can explain why relief is
sometimes granted, while still being entirely consistent with a high
degree of judicial caution in the expansion of this particular rem-
edy. Our view, in other words, is completely consistent with a de-
fault rule against the recognition of such claims. In situations where
an actor is already subject to regulations to protect certain parties
from exposure to toxins, and where the actor engages in wrongful
conduct that rises to the level of gross negligence or beyond, a case
can sometimes be made for departing from the default rule, though
even here other factors, such as concern to afford relief to those
who have already suffered ultimate harms, may counsel caution. In
sum, if medical monitoring claims are understood as claims for eq-
uitable relief, the courts will be in a better position to integrate pol-
icy considerations of the sort identified by Justice Breyer into case-
by-case assessments of the appropriateness of class certification, or
the granting of relief. By realizing what is happening courts sitting
in equity will be in a position to bring a greater degree of coher-
ence and fairness to this burgeoning corner of tort law.
CONCLUSION
We hope that some readers will at least be intrigued by our ef-
forts to rationalize medical monitoring law through a distinction
between equitably enforceable duties of conduct and duties of re-
pair enforceable through lump-sum liability awards. We hope the
same for our efforts to re-theorize fear-of-disease law in terms of
the idea that one must sometimes be vigilant to avoid exposing
plaintiffs to threatening situations. Finally, we hope to have helped
justify tort law's general refusal to treat increased risk of harm as a
' Buckley, 521 U.S. at 442-43; see id. at 453 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting).
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cognizable injury, and to explain its ban on recovery absent injury
in terms of an idea of civil recourse.
At the same time, we worry that some will find these efforts to
be old-fashioned, even formalistic. Having created this particular
risk, we feel obliged to minimize the chances of its realization. Ac-
cordingly, we aim in this Conclusion to temper possible bad im-
pressions by providing a better idea of the more pragmatic side of
our perspective.
As noted in the Introduction, one might profitably view Ameri-
can tort law in the first half of the twentieth century as dominated
by two figures: Justices Holmes and Cardozo. The two men shared
a great deal, both in terms of their careers and, more importantly,
their aspirations for the law. Each took his most basic project to be
the modernization of law; the readjustment of law to contemporary
problems. Each, one would say in modern parlance, was realistic or
pragmatic. Still, not all forms of pragmatism are the same and, in
fact, the two advocated very different forms of the general disposi-
tion toward pragmatism. Holmes's pragmatism combined a respect
for clearly stated legal rules as a source of stability, an enthusiasm
for social science as a form of knowledge and control, and an un-
derstanding of the law purely as an instrument for the realization
of desirable social goals. 4 This simultaneous embrace of formalism
to guide judicial decision-making, and macro-level, policy-based in-
strumentalism, helped keep a lid on his deep skepticism about the
content of legal concepts and the possibility of any genuine form of
knowledge about morality and other normative subjects. Pragma-
tism as doctrinally constrained instrumentalism promised to ad-
dress changing conditions and novel problems by keeping the law's
goals and its shell of rules relatively continuous, while permitting
knowledgeable alteration of hypotheses about which patterns of
legal sanctions will most successfully realize those goals. To the ex-
tent that this rough sketch captures Holmes, the law and economics
approach to torts may fairly claim to be realizing the Holmesian
side of pragmatism's legacy for law.
.. Golderg, supra note 4, at 1432-33, 1458-61 (contrasting Justice Holmes and Jus-
tice Cardozo); Goldberg & Zipursky, supra note 4, at 1753-56, 1812-24 (contrasting
Justice Holmes' and Justice Cardozo's understandings of duty and negligence).
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Cardozo shared with Holmes a recognition of the value of stabil-
ity in law, an abiding interest in social science, and a faith that soci-
ety could and should be improved in a democratic system through
intelligent and self-conscious legal evolution. But Cardozo's body
of work represents a quite different form of pragmatism, for he was
neither an instrumentalist nor a skeptic. As his occasionally sanc-
timonious opinions indicate, he took seriously the language of right
and duty, and legal concepts more generally. While he shared the
pragmatist's faith that all must remain open to revision, this did not
cause him to disdain the principles of the common law. Rather it
generated a belief that he could work with those principles without
being metaphysically locked in. We have referred to this approach
as "pragmatic conceptualism" or "conceptualistic pragmatism."' It
is pragmatic because it commits itself to nothing more than what
our legal practices give us; it does not rest upon any claims about
"external" legal or moral reality; and it insists on coherence and
openness to revision without being doctrinaire or ideological. It is
conceptualistic, as opposed to instrumentalist, because it takes le-
gal concepts and legal principles seriously, as fundamental to what
makes common law a form of law.
In twentieth-century tort scholarship (and perhaps in legal
scholarship generally), it is clear which form of pragmatism won
out: Holmes 1, Cardozo 0. Yet even in terms of its own metric of
evaluation-usefulness in adjusting the law to change and in solv-
ing social problems-we are not persuaded that Holmes deserves
the victory. The view of tort law as a means to achieve efficient al-
location of resources and activity levels, to serve goals of deter-
rence and compensation, or to enforce an all-purpose fault princi-
ple, each has deep flaws. So pervasive is this problem that huge and
important areas of tort-in this instance, those pertaining to risk
generation, fear, and medical monitoring-seem largely arbitrary
with respect to the instrumentalist understanding of the law. Thus,
even an astute and learned judge such as Justice Breyer finds it dif-
ficult to articulate a rationale in support of his intuition that Buck-
ley perhaps ought to be able to recover medical monitoring pay-
ments from a court-supervised fund.
2" See discussion supra notes 5-6 and accompanying text.
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As noted at the outset, even a dyed-in-the-wool Holmesian such
as Dean Prosser could, at times, adopt the posture of a pragmatic
conceptualist. We have offered, in this paper, another instance of
how the pragmatic path not taken-the pragmatic conceptualism
of Cardozo-can advance legal analysis and help modernize the
law. The topic selected concerns matters outside the purview of
courts one hundred or even fifty years ago: the proper response of
courts to plaintiffs who claim to have been put at grave risk of in-
jury, in great fear of injury, or to great expense by exposure to haz-
ardous materials. Still, at an interpretive level, it has proved neces-
sary to analyze each of these areas by probing the conceptual
structure undergirding the law of torts. With respect to truly incho-
ate wrongs, we needed to understand the realization requirement,
the concept of recourse, and the sense in which tort law conceptu-
ally is quite different from a criminal and regulatory law. In the
fear-of-injury cases, we needed to resist the temptation to elimi-
nate the distinction between predicate and parasitic injury, and, in-
deed, to resist the blurring of injury and harm and to ask hard
normative questions about the conditions under which emotional
distress over the possibility of a future injury or illness is cogniza-
ble. We also were required to take seriously the idea of duty-
when and how one is obligated to be vigilant of the emotional well-
being of others. Finally, on the medical monitoring front, we saw
that even to explain the direction of a hard-headed regulatory
judge like Justice Breyer in Buckley, we needed to address the dis-
tinction between equitable relief and damages.
The advantages of this approach go beyond the capacity to in-
terpret doctrine cogently. It provides the possibility of advancing
doctrine in a manner that has a better chance of succeeding. If pure
risk is the concern, then the appropriate solution is criminal or
regulatory law, not tort law. In the fear cases, this means not rely-
ing on crude concerns about floodgates and fraud, but thinking se-
riously about what sorts of emotional injury to guard against, and
in what sorts of settings. In the medical monitoring area, it means
recognizing that those who create significant risks of injury have a
duty to help mitigate those same risks and that those duties might
sometimes be appropriately enforced through a court order.
Although the dominant American tradition has been to treat it
as an infinitely plastic department of the law, tort law, ironically,
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functions less adequately when it is so conceived. Tort law does
more good when it progresses with a pragmatic sense of itself as a
law of civil recourse. At its best, tort law is progressive yet stable: It
articulates and enforces our evolving obligations to one another
against the backdrop of an enduring need for a civil forum in which
to adjudicate claims and disputes that would otherwise devolve
into private vengeance. Armed with this realization, courts and
commentators will have a better chance of enabling tort law to re-
alize its function.

